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ABSTRACT
Mental imagery is a common component in a range of emotion regulation techniques. However,
the effectiveness and neural mechanisms of regulation via mental imagery are underexplored due
to a lack of studies targeting mental imagery specifically. This discrepancy results in uncertainty
regarding the mechanism of regulation in existing paradigms. Biased competition for attentional
resources presents a plausible model by which a mental imagery-based distracter can
downregulate response to an emotional stimulus. If visualizing an imagined distracter effectively
regulates emotional response, the inclusion of mental imagery components in other techniques
represents a potential confound. To address this discrepancy, this dissertation investigates the
effectiveness and neural correlates of mental imagery in the regulation of differentially
conditioned fear. Results of this investigation indicate that mental imagery-based regulation is
comparably effective to object-based distraction, but requires a greater investment of cognitive
resources to perform. Furthermore, while neural mechanisms of this regulation are consistent
with biased competition, mental imagery-based distraction demonstrates notable differences in
neural correlates from those identified in object-based distraction. In conclusion, mental imagery
represents both a distinct and effective technique in emotion regulation.

vii

INTRODUCTION
We do not typically choose to experience an emotion. Regulation, distraction, distancing,
and mindfulness all allow us to manipulate our emotional experience voluntarily, but the initial
appraisal of an emotional stimulus occurs as soon as the stimulus is attended (Ochsner & Gross,
2005). Emotional stimuli include those that are inherently aversive or conducive, as well as
stimuli that have become associated with aversive or conducive outcomes. This leaves the
experience of emotion in the complex position of relying on both subjective and automatic
processes (Knight, Waters, & Bandettini, 2009; Mechias, Etkin, & Kalisch, 2010; Phillips,
Ladouceur, & Drevets, 2008; Todd, Cunningham, Anderson, & Thompson, 2012). Interaction
between these subjective and associative influences results in ongoing modulation of our
emotional experience (Todd et al., 2012). The functional and anatomical bases of these
interactions are still being explored. This investigation seeks to clarify the cognitive and neural
mechanisms underlying voluntary regulation of conditioned fear response, with a focus on visual
imagery as a regulation tactic.
Visual imagery was chosen as the target of our investigation due to its common inclusion
in emotion regulation techniques, particularly those using distraction (Kanske, Schönfelder,
Forneck, & Wessa, 2015; Ochsner, Silvers, & Buhle, 2012; Scheibe, Sheppes, & Staudinger,
2015; Strauss, Ossenfort, & Whearty, 2016). The biased competition model of attention selection
offers a framework from which we can predict how object-based and mental imagery-based
regulation will affect fear processing (Bishop, 2008; Blair & Mitchell, 2009). Differential fear
conditioning was chosen as our method of establishing a fear response throughout the
investigation. This approach allowed high experimental control over our stimuli and explored an
under-represented approach to fear regulation research (Delgado, Nearing, LeDoux, & Phelps,
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2008; Greening et al., 2021). By measuring self-reported fear and skin conductance (SCR) in
addition to fMRI, we could address both subjective and autonomic changes across regulation.
Meanwhile, fMRI allowed us to investigate the neural mechanisms underlying these changes.
Our investigation began with a study using self-report and physiological measures to test
the prediction that mental imagery can regulate differential fear conditioning with similar
effectiveness to visual distracters (STUDY 1). This was followed by an fMRI study that sought
to determine the neural basis of visual imagery as a regulation technique, with a focus on activity
in the anterior insula (aIn) and regions associated with visual processing of faces and places
(STUDY 2). In the final study, we attempted to distinguish between processes in the anterior
insula related to subjective appraisal with those related to associative learning in the amygdala
(STUDY 3). This experiment used a repeated shock/no-shock paradigm with reported threat
expectancy in addition to fMRI measures of blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) activity.

FEAR CONDITIONING IN EMOTION RESEARCH
In emotion research, differential fear conditioning refers to the repeated pairing of an
aversive stimulus with a neutral stimulus to build a learned association between the originally
neutral stimulus and feelings of aversion. For example, an initially neutral image of an object or
animal could be paired with a mild aversive shock to produce a fearful association between
seeing the image and feeling the painful outcome. In conditioning paradigms, these two stimuli
are referred to as the conditioned stimulus (CS), in the case of the original image, and the
unconditioned stimulus (US), in the case of the aversive shock. Following conditioning, the
trained CS is referred to as the CS+, while a control stimulus without aversive association is
referred to as the CS-. The use of fear conditioning in studies of emotion offers a way to reduce
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the impact of participants’ idiosyncratic reactions to a picture or scene and ensure internal
validity in studying emotion (Delgado et al., 2008; Greening et al., 2021). Additionally, fear
conditioning can be performed with simple images to minimize potential confounds. Currently,
the majority of studies addressing fear utilize standardized visual stimuli such as the ubiquitous
IAPS set (Buhle et al., 2014; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997; Ochsner & Gross, 2005).
Standardized affective image sets rely on emotionally graded scenes that can often be visually
distinct from neutral or positive scenes (Redies, Grebenkina, Mohseni, Kaduhm, & Dobel, 2020),
and may introduce unplanned differences between conditions that can be avoided in differential
conditioning paradigms. A wide range of individual differences in response to emotional scenes
has also been noted for affective image sets (Barke, Stahl, & Kröner-Herwig, 2012; Ito &
Cacioppo, 2005). This is of particular concern for smaller within-subjects designs such as those
used in many fMRI studies.
Comparison between unconditioned fear-evoking stimuli such as the IAPS set and
conditioned fear stimuli indicates differences in the neural pathways involved in these responses
(Knight et al., 2009). Existing research has drawn strong associations between amygdala activity
and fear (Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010). However, studies investigating conditioned fear response
have shown reactivity in both the amygdala and anterior insula with varying degrees of
consistency (Dunsmoor et al., 2011; Fullana et al., 2016; Knight et al., 2009; McRae et al.,
2010). Meta-analysis of conditioned fear studies shows that amygdala activation has not been
universally identified across fear paradigms, despite its association with fear learning and
experience (Fullana et al., 2016). Mechanical differences between unconditioned and
conditioned fear raise the concern that studies targeting one form of fear may not reliably apply
to the other.
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SUBJECTIVE FEAR AND AUTONOMIC RESPONSE
Basic emotions such as fear can be described as both autonomic drives and appraisal of
subjective emotional experience (Berridge, 2018; Flannelly, Koenig, Galek, & Ellison, 2007;
Hofmann, 2008; Riskind, 1997). In appraising our fear response, we are integrating external
information with interception of our internal emotional and physiological state (Hofmann, 2008;
Ochsner & Gross, 2005). How we describe, operationalize, and measure “fear” in this context
requires careful consideration. Autonomic reactivity such as skin conductance response (SCR)
may reflect a component of the fear experience, but may not fully measure subjective fear as an
emotional state (LeDoux & Pine, 2016). Understanding this distinction becomes critical in the
case of emotion regulation, where failing to measure the impact of regulation on the subjective
experience of fear may misrepresent the effects of regulation. We argue that both autonomic
response and subjective fear must be measured to accurately model cognitive-affective
interactions such as emotion regulation via distraction. Existing evidence supports autonomic
response as a measure of conditioned associative fear (Esteves, Parra, Dimberg, & Öhman, 1994;
Hodes, Cook, & Lang, 1985). However, the relationship between associative fear and subjective
awareness of fear is complex, with conflicting reports of neural correlates for subjective
appraisal (Mechias et al., 2010), and growing evidence that autonomic response does not map
one-to-one with subjective experience of fear (Taschereau-Dumouchel, Kawato, & Lau, 2020). If
associative fear response and inherently fearful stimuli rely on different functional pathways for
their effectiveness, how these different pathways vary in their interaction with subjective
appraisal is uncertain.
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In conditioning models, we find a case in which predictions by models of subjective
appraisal and those of associative learning may lead to contradictions. As a conditioned response
is acquired, the associative strength model predicts that the strength of the learned response
increases with more frequent pairings of the CS and US (Perruchet, 2015; Rescorla & Solomon,
1967). This follows the classic Pavlovian interpretation of fear conditioning. In contrast to the
associative strength model, the expectancy model posits that fear conditioning is the result of a
conscious expectation of the US following the CS (Boddez, Moors, Mertens, & De Houwer,
2020; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). This implies a subjective appraisal of threat
when presented with the CS and propositional knowledge of its relationship to the aversive US.
In the expectancy model, sequential un-reinforced presentations of the CS bias participants
towards higher expectation of the US (Burns & Corpus, 2004), in direct contradiction to the
predictions of the associative strength model.
From these models, we demonstrate that approaching conditioned fear as subjective
appraisal or associative response exclusively can result in different predicted outcomes. A third
approach is to treat both components as parts of an integrated two-systems model (LeDoux &
Pine, 2016). However, the two-systems model is underexplored. One paradigm that attempts to
compare subjective expectation and associative strength behaviorally has shown that number of
sequential un-reinforced CS presentations predicted subjective threat expectancy, in support of
the expectancy model (Perruchet, Grégoire, Aerts, & Poulin-Charronnat, 2016). However, prior
to this investigation, the neural correlates of this paradigm had not been explored for comparison
with previous research in fear acquisition and regulation.
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VISUAL STIMULI IN EMOTION REGULATION
A core focus of this investigation is the role of visual processing in the regulation of
conditioned fear. Emotion regulation literature relies heavily on visual stimuli, such as the
aforementioned IAPS set, as well as visual distraction paradigms. mental imagery-based or
imagined distractors, however, are underrepresented in the literature. Visual distraction is
assumed to operate via goal-directed attention selection (Desimone & Duncan, 1995), in which
top-down attentional control can bias the processing of attended stimuli over that of unattended
stimuli. As attentional capacity is limited, unattended stimuli are represented less clearly in the
brain and their associated impact is diminished. This process is described by the biased
competition model (Bishop, 2008; Blair & Mitchell, 2009). In the context of emotion regulation,
biased competition comprises both the top-down influence of attention selection and bottom-up
influences from stimulus features such as complexity and emotional valence. Existing literature
supports attention selection as a mechanism of emotion regulation, consistent with the
predictions of this model (Bishop, 2008; Blair & Mitchell, 2009; Desimone & Duncan, 1995).
For example, despite the bottom-up influence of a negative emotional scene, directing attention
to non-emotional parts of the scene, or away from the scene entirely, can result in
downregulation of the negative stimulus. Competition for attentional resources is assumed to
have similar effects on emotion processing whether the target is object-based or mental imagerybased. Unlike object-oriented attention, mental imagery is internally directed. However, similar
regions of the brain are activated by mental imagery as are found during visual perception, albeit
to a weaker extent (Ganis, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 2004; Pearson, Naselaris, Holmes, & Kosslyn,
2015). If so, mental imagery should represent a target for attention selection under the biased
competition model. Evidence suggests that mental imagery can downregulate differential fear
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conditioning by disrupting prefrontal representation of the emotional stimulus (Greening et al.,
2021). However, this effect has not been directly compared to object-based distraction, and has
only been demonstrated using low-level visual stimuli, rather than objects, faces, or scenes. This
limits our ability to compare these findings to other distraction and emotion regulation
techniques. As a result, it is unknown whether mental imagery is able to downregulate a
conditioned stimulus as effectively as object-based distraction.
Visual imagery components can also be found in other emotion regulation techniques.
Tasks in emotion regulation research regularly describe imagining outcomes or context changes
(McRae et al., 2012; Opitz, Cavanagh, & Urry, 2015), but the degree to which these processes
depend on visual imagery is unclear. If visual imagery is a significant part of the mechanism of
these techniques, it calls into question our understanding of how this regulation takes place in the
brain. Biased competition models suggest that competition between an imagined distracter and a
visual fear stimulus could result in limited availability of perceptual processing resources and
reduction in the representation of the fear stimulus even before amygdala activation, should both
stimuli rely on visual processing centers (Bishop, 2008; Greening, Lee, & Mather, 2014).
However, the process model of emotion regulation describes attention-based regulation and
cognitive reappraisal as sequential steps, in which reappraisal can only be performed when
attending to an emotional stimulus (Gross, 1998). Competition for visual processing resources in
many regulation paradigms, such as reappraisal, would suggest that these techniques are more
mechanically similar to distraction than the cognitive manipulations described by regulation
literature (Buhle, et al., 2014; Gross, 1998; Ochsner & Gross, 2005) and are misrepresented in
existing research.
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NEURAL CORRELATES OF VISUAL EMOTION REGULATION
Clarifying the mechanisms of interaction between visual imagery and conditioned fear
requires targeted investigation of the neural pathways associated with fear and emotion
regulation. The neural basis of emotion is distributed across a number of regions, including the
amygdala, hypothalamus, insula, and areas of the prefrontal cortex associated with the subjective
emotional experience (Etkin, Egner, & Kalisch, 2011; LeDoux, 2003; McRae, Ciesielski, &
Gross, 2012; Wager, Davidson, Hughes, Lindquist, & Ochsner, 2008). As previously noted, the
amygdala has been a central focus in emotion research (LeDoux, 2003). Studies have also
demonstrated the anterior insula to be another predictor of fear experience in fear conditioning
paradigms (Etkin et al., 2015; Kanske et al., 2011; Otto, Misra, Prasad, & McRae, 2014). Metaanalyses indicate a relationship between elevated activity in the anterior insula and decreases in
amygdala response, suggesting that the anterior insula plays a role in the regulation of emotion
(Delgado, Nearing, LeDoux, & Phelps, 2008; Etkin, Büchel, & Gross, 2015; Ochsner, Silvers, &
Buhle, 2012). Given the insula’s involvement in interoception and awareness of emotional states
(Craig, 2009), these patterns fit the hypothesis that activity the anterior insula reflects subjective
appraisal of fear more so than associative learning.
Furthermore, frontoparietal regions associated with cognitive control processes, such as
those implied by directed visual attention, have demonstrated top-down modulation of the
activity in the anterior insula and amygdala (Teckentrup, et al., 2019, Wager, et al., 2008).
Connectivity analysis of the insula and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during visual search
tasks shows elevated functional connectivity when resisting emotional distraction (Pedale,
Macaluso, & Santangelo, 2019). Functional overlap between visual perception and mental
imagery in working memory (Pearson, Naselaris, Holmes, & Kosslyn, 2015) suggests that a
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regulatory task utilizing visual imagery could interact similarly to an external visual distractor
with regards to emotional regulation. In summary, if the insula receives top-town influences
from prefrontal regions associated with working memory and visual attention during subjective
appraisal of emotion, competition for resources between a visual emotional stimulus and an
imagined distracter could result in decreased subjective fear without changes to associative
learning. This would separate regulatory techniques that use visual imagery from forms of fear
regulation shown to alter long-term associations (Ahn, et al., 2015).

GOALS AND CENTRAL HYPOTHESIS
The primary goal of this investigation is to assess the regulation of fear using mental
imagery as measured by self-report, physiological, and BOLD intensity. The secondary aim is to
dissociate the neural correlates of subjective fear experience and autonomic fear response. This
additional aim was formed following results from the first two studies. The central hypothesis of
our research is that using visual imagery to regulate conditioned fear will effectively downregulate fear as measured via self-report and physiological response, and that this regulation will
be detectable via corresponding BOLD activity in the anterior insula. Activity in the amygdala is
predicted to reflect fear learning, but not subjective fear appraisal, with elevated activity in the
dlPFC present during subjective appraisal. These hypotheses are based on existing literature on
the distinct roles of the anterior insula and amygdala as parts of the network responsible for fear
learning and regulation (Alves et al., 2013; Etkin et al., 2015; Dunsmoore et al., 2011; Kanske et
al., 2011), and evidence that the anterior insula (aIn) may represent a metric for subjective fear
intensity in regulation paradigms (Buhle et al., 2014; Kanske et al., 2011). Current literature
supports the presence of a functional network between the prefrontal cortex, insula, and
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amygdala during fear regulation of unconditioned stimuli (Deen et al., 2011; Zou et al., 2016), in
support of the secondary aim of our investigation.
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CHAPTER 1. OBJECT-BASED ATTENTION VERSUS MENTAL
IMAGERY
Just as when a physician instructs a patient to imagine the coming weekend before
sticking them with the needle, distraction is a ubiquitous strategy for emotion regulation. While
attentional processes such as distraction are a central component in many theoretical models of
emotion control (Gross, 1998, 2015; Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002; Ochsner &
Gross, 2005), most research into distraction has relied on external distraction tasks. For example,
ignoring an aversive stimulus and instead attending to externally presented visual, verbal, or
mathematical reasoning tasks can significantly reduce measures of negative affect (Kanske,
Heissler, Schönfelder, Bongers, & Wessa, 2011; Lim, Padmala, & Pessoa, 2009; McRae, 2016;
Pessoa, Kastner, & Ungerleider, 2002). However, as the opening example demonstrates, emotion
control can also be carried out via internal distraction, for example using mental imagery
(Delgado, Nearing, LeDoux, & Phelps, 2008; Greening et al., 2021; Martins, Ponzio, Velasco,
Kaplan, & Mather, 2015; Opitz, Cavanagh, & Urry, 2015). The purpose of the present study is to
compare the impact of external versus internal distraction (i.e., visual imagery) on differential
fear conditioning as measured by self-reported fear and skin conductance response (SCR).
The majority of emotion regulation studies involving external distraction rely on the use
of visual scenes as the emotion elicitor (Kanske et al., 2011; McRae et al., 2010; Ochsner et al.,
2012; Scheibe et al., 2015; Strauss et al., 2016), such as the ubiquitous IAPS (Lang et al., 1997).
However, such emotional scenes can produce highly varied and idiosyncratic responses across
participants (Barke et al., 2012; Ito & Cacioppo, 2005). Moreover, the inclusion of a neutral
condition requires the use of neutral scenes which can be quite visually distinct from the
emotional scenes (Redies et al., 2020). On the other hand, differential fear conditioning offers a
robust tool for studying the cognitive control of fear with a high degree of experimental control
11

(Delgado, Nearing, LeDoux, & Phelps, 2008; Greening et al., 2021). In differential fear
conditioning, an initially neutral conditioned stimulus (CS+) is paired with an unconditioned
aversive stimulus (US; e.g., mild shock) while a second conditioned stimulus (CS-) is never
paired with the US. Successfully fear conditioning has occurred if the CS+ without the US elicits
a greater conditioned response than the CS-. The conditioned response can include self-reported
fear, or autonomic reactivity such as the SCR (Fullana et al., 2015; Kim & Jung, 2006; Lovibond
& Shanks, 2002).
External distraction appears to operate via the mechanisms of goal-directed attention
selection (Desimone & Duncan, 1995), and is a reliable form of emotion regulation (Gross,
1998; Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Pessoa & Ungerleider, 2004). This has been demonstrated using a
variety of attentional manipulations, such as covert spatial attention (Pessoa, McKenna,
Gutierrez, & Ungerleider, 2002), feature-based attention (Fusar-Poli et al., 2009), and objectbased attention (Lim, Padmala, & Pessoa, 2008; Mitchell et al., 2007). In general, goal-directed
attention prioritizes the processing of the distracter, thereby suppressing the perceptual
processing of the emotional stimulus (Bishop, 2008; Blair & Mitchell, 2009). In the case of
visual emotional stimuli, this suppression of processing has been observed throughout aspects of
the ventral visual pathway, including occipital and temporal regions (Amting, Miller, Chow, &
Mitchell, 2009; Pessoa & Ungerleider, 2004). Regarding differential conditioning, the
suppression of perceptual processing has been shown to produce subsequent down-regulation of
amygdala activity or SCR (Delgado et al., 2008; Lim et al., 2008), though its effect on selfreported fear is unknown.
In addition to the processes of externally directed attention selection, attention can also be
directed internally in order to prioritize information already stored in mind (Chun, Golomb, &
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Turk-Browne, 2011). Visual mental imagery is an example of internally directed attention, which
activates similar regions of visual processing as those engaged during visual perception, though
to a weaker extent (Ganis et al., 2004; Pearson et al., 2015). This suggests that mental imagery
could be employed as a form of internal distraction in the context of emotion regulation that
operates via similar goal-directed attention selection mechanisms as an external distracter.
Recent evidence suggests that mental imagery can modulate differential fear conditioning via
goal-directed internal attention by disrupting the representation of the emotion elicitor in early
visual cortices (Greening et al., 2021). However, Greening et al. (2021) relied on a basic lowlevel visual stimulus (a Gabor patch) and did not compare their manipulation of internal
distraction to external distraction. Thus, it is unknown how effective mental imagery is as an
internal distraction for more complex objects commonly associated with emotion, such as faces,
or how internal distraction compares to external distraction as an emotion regulation strategy.
The present study tested the hypothesis that both external (object-based attention) and
internal (i.e., mental imagery) distraction can effectively down-regulate differential fear
conditioning. A novel paradigm was developed that presents CS+ and CS- face images along
with intact or scrambled distracter place images (i.e., a building or a house) in the form of
composite images. Participants were instructed to attend to the face stimulus (i.e., the CS+ or
CS-), or to either attend to or imagine the place image. Alternatively, as mental imagery is more
analogous to a weaker form of perception (Pearson et al., 2015), we would predict that either the
magnitude of down-regulation produced by mental imagery would be less than that produced by
external distraction, or the effort required to produce the same magnitude of down-regulation
would be greater for internal compared to external distraction.
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METHODS
Participants
Forty-three undergraduate participants (32 female, 11 male), aged 18-24 were recruited
through Louisiana State University’s SONA system. Participants reported no presence or history
of psychological or neurological disorders. As no sufficiently similar research has been
published on the topic of external and internal distraction, the target sample size was based on
prior studies in distraction and fear conditioning using visual imagery or external distraction.
With previous samples in the range of 9-26 participants (Delgado et al., 2008; Greening et al.,
2021; Lim & Pessoa, 2008; Yates, Ashwin, & Fox, 2010), we aimed for a final sample size
greater than 30-35. All participants gave written informed consent and the protocol was approved
by the Louisiana State University institutional review board.
Materials
Participants completed three phases over the course of the experiment: Habituation, Fear
Conditioning, and Regulation. The Regulation phase was comprised of two distinct alternating
blocks of trials: The External Distracter blocks (Ext. blocks) and the Internal Distracter blocks
(Int. blocks). Experimental Ext. and Int. blocks were always interleaved, and their order was
counterbalanced order across participants. These phases consisted of series of presented visual
stimuli, paired with audio instructions and, in the case of the Fear Conditioning and Regulation
phases, a calibrated shock stimulus. The visual conditioned stimuli used were two standardized
greyscale face images drawn from the Cohn-Kanade emotional faces database. Both images
depict white males with neutral emotional affect. The face images were cropped to show only the
face from hairline to chin and had the background replaced with a flat grey tone. One face image
served as the CS+, the other the CS-. The image selected as the CS+ was counterbalanced across
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participants. The images used as distracters were two greyscale place images depicting a house
and a building. As with the face images, the background was replaced with a flat grey tone. Face
and Place images were then combined to produce composite (see Figure 1.1) images (O’Craven,
Downing, & Kanwisher, 1999; Serences, 2004), with a critical difference between the two
distraction blocks. In External Distraction blocks, both the face and place images were both
visually intact in the generated composites. On the other hand, in the Internal Distraction blocks,
another set of composite images was generated in which the face images were visually intact and
the place images were scrambled along a 10x10 grid (each element was made up of 40x40
pixels) before being layering with a face image (Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1 Experiment structure and example stimuli for Conditioning and Regulation Phases.
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The purpose of using scrambled images during Internal distraction trials was to ensure that the
same degree of visual complexity and low-level visual features were present during both the
External and Internal blocks of the Regulation Phase. Additionally, this ensured that the face
stimuli were visually salient to the same extent during both external and internal distraction.
The audio instructions used in the Regulation phases were generated using TextAloud
text-to-speech software (Language: British English, Voice: Emma, Speed: Medium). Twosecond sound clips were produced that instructed participants to either “Attend Face,” “Attend
House,” “Attend Building,” “Imagine House,” or “Imagine Building.”
A mild electrical shock to the distal phalanges of the pointer and middle fingers of the
dominant hand served as the unconditioned stimulus (US). Shocks were delivered using a
BIOPAC STMISOC module for a duration of 5ms at 50Hz and co-terminated with the CS+.
Shock intensity was calibrated independently for each participant to highest intensity described
as “uncomfortable, but not yet painful” (Range: 2.00-50.00 mA). Shock intensity was calibrated
in a single session prior to the conditioning phase.
Design and Procedure
Habituation Phase
Prior to fear acquisition, participants were habituated to the two face and two place
images to ensure neutral baseline reactivity to all images, as well as to expose participants to the
distracter images they would later be instructed to visualize. Composite images were not
included in the Habituation phase, and no audio instructions or shocks were delivered at this
stage. The Habituation phase consisted of 2 presentations per face or place image, for a total of 8
trials. Each trial included an initial two-second fixation dot, a 4-second image presentation, and a
14-second inter-trial interval (ITI) with a fixation dot. Participants were instructed at the
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beginning of the phase to keep their eyes on the central fixation dot and to pay attention as they
would need to visualize some of the images later.
Fear Conditioning Acquisition Phase
In the conditioning phase, participants completed a single block of the fear-conditioning
task. During this phase the CS+ and was paired with a co-terminating shock on 60% of
presentations. The CS- was never paired with the US. Each face image was presented 10 times
for 20 total trials. Trials in the conditioning phase consisted of an initial 2-second fixation dot, a
4-second image presentation, and a 14-second ITI with fixation dot. No audio instructions were
delivered during this phase following the initial instruction to focus on the fixation point and
maintain attention on the presented images.
Emotion Regulation Phase
The Regulation phase consisted of alternating External (Ext.) and Internal (Int.)
Distraction blocks. In both Ext. and Int. blocks, trials began with a two 2-second audio
instruction with fixation dot. The auditory instruction was followed by a 4-second image
presentation of either a face alone, a place alone, or a composite image. Each trial ended with a
12-second ITI with fixation dot. Blocks included 2 CS+ alone, 2 CS- alone, 2 House alone, 2
Building alone, 1 CS+ alone with reinforcing shock, and 8 trials with composite images
producing our 4 key conditions of interest, each of which comprised 2 trials per block: The CS+
Attend Face condition [i.e., CS+ face w/ house (“attend face”) and CS+ face w/ building (“attend
face”)]; the CS+ Attend Place condition [i.e. CS+ face w/ house (“attend house”) and CS+ face
w/ building (“attend building”)]; the CS- Attend Face condition [i.e. CS- face w/ house (“attend
face”) and CS- face w/ building (“attend face”)]; and the CS- Attend Place condition [i.e. CSface w/ house (“attend house”) and CS- face w/ building (“attend building”)]. There were 17
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trials per block in total. On External Distraction blocks, the composite images consisted of a face
(CS+ or CS-) and a visually intact distracter (House or Building). Participants were instructed to
“attend face,” “attend house,” or “attend building,” prior to each image presentation. In the
Internal Distraction blocks, the composite images consisted of a visually presented face and a
scrambled distracter image, with participants instructed to “attend face,” “imagine house,” or
“imagine building,” prior to each image.
Self-report Methods and Analysis
Self-report data was gathered via a questionnaire presented after the completion of the
experiment. Participants were instructed to report their level of fear when viewing each of the
face, place, and composite images shown throughout the study. Participants also reported their
perceived difficulty performing the distracter tasks for each condition involving composite
images and the vividness of imagery during the imagined distracter task (i.e., the Internal
blocks).
Participants’ self-reported fear and task difficulty were independently analyzed using a
2x2x2 within-subjects ANOVA to compare conditions across CS type (CS+, CS-), target (face,
distracter), and distracter type (visual, imagined). Three participants were excluded from analysis
of self-report fear and difficulty data due to unreadable responses to one or more questions. Selfreported vividness was only reported for the two Internal Distraction conditions. Vividness
ratings were analyzed by paired-samples t-test.
Physiological Methods and Analysis
Skin conductance (SCR) values were recorded throughout the conditioning and
experimental phases using a BIOPAC MP-150 data acquisition system sampling at 2000Hz.
Electrodes for SCR measurement were attached to second and third digit of the non-dominant
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hand, opposite the shock electrodes on the second and third digit of the dominant hand. SCR
acquisition and processing were performing using AcqKnowledge (BIOPAC systems, Goleta,
CA, USA) and Matlab R2019b (version 9.7.0) software.
SCR data analysis followed steps derived from previous research (Grégoire & Greening,
2019; Jiang, Burleigh, & Greening, 2021). Preprocessing applied a first-order Butterworth
bandpass filter with a frequency range of .05 to 5 Hz. Data were then detrended and downsampled to 100Hz. A time window from 1.0-6.5 seconds after onset was extracted for each SCR
epoch and baseline-corrected against the mean signal from one second before the epoch onset.
Trials within this window with peak SCR values .02μS above baseline were extracted and all
other trials were zeroed. Peak SCR values by condition were then analyzed using a 2x2x2 (CS
type (CS+, CS-), target (face, distracter), and distracter type (visual, imagined)) within-subjects
ANOVA. SCR data for eleven participants were discarded as non-responders such that there was
no reliable SCR response to the US (i.e., the mild shock), due to excessive noise in the time
series such that reliable SCRs could not be extracted, or due to a technical failure in acquisition.

RESULTS
SCR Results
Conditioning Phase
SCR was the only measure gathered during the conditioning phase. Importantly, analysis
using paired-samples t-test confirmed that there was significant group-level differential fear
conditioning (Figure 1.2a). SCR values during presentation of the CS+ (M = 0.69, SD = 0.53)
were significantly higher than during presentation of the CS- (M = 0.31, SD = 0.27), t(31) =
5.605, p < .001, d = 0.92.
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Regulation Phase
SCR effects during face-alone trials in the regulation blocks were first analyzed to
determine whether the effects of conditioning persisted through the experimental trials (Figure
1.2b). A 1-way within-subjects ANOVA comparing CS+ face-alone, CS- face-alone, and placealone conditions showed a main effect of CS-type [F(1,31) = 6.37, p = .017, η2 = .17]. Pairedsamples t-tests identified significant differences in response between CS+ and CS- face-alone
images, t(31) = 2.062, p = .048, d = 0.25, supporting the presence of differential conditioning.
SCR was also significantly lower in the presence of place-alone images than either CS+, t(31) =
2.524, p = .017, d = 0.50, or CS-, t(31) = 2.736, p = .010, d = 0.26, images.

Figure 1.2. Effects of CS-type on SCR during Conditioning Phase (a); stimulus type on SCR
during Regulation Phase (b); and CS-type, attentional target, and block-type on SCR during
Regulation Phase (c). Error bars show 95% confidence interval. Each dot represents one
participant.
Next, we inspected participant SCR during the composite image presentations (Figure
1.2c). A repeated-measures 2x2x2 ANOVA, with CS-type (CS+, CS-), attentional target (attend
face, attend/imagine place), and block type (External, Internal) as within-subject variables
identified a main effect of attentional target (attend face vs attend/imagine place) [F(1,31) =
5.317, p = .028, η2 =.006], such that irrespective of CS-type and block-type there was higher
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recorded SCR when attending to the face stimuli compared to attending to or imagining the place
stimuli.
Table 1.1. Study 1 ANOVA Results, GSR Values in Regulation Phases
Predictor
(Intercept)
CS
Target
Block
CS x Target
CS x Block
Target x
Block
CS x Target
x Block

dfNum
1
1
1
1
1
1

dfDen
31
31
31
31
31
31

SSNum
14.64
0.02
0.08
0.01
0.01
0.01

1

31

0.02

1

31

0.00

F
51.53
0.51
5.32
0.13
2.67
1.40

p
.000
.482
.028
.721
.112
.245

η2g
.52
.00
.01
.00
.00
.00

1.01

0.63

.434

.00

0.36

0.10

.753

.00

SSDen
8.81
0.94
0.49
1.63
0.12
0.32

Note. dfNum indicates degrees of freedom numerator. dfDen indicates degrees of freedom
denominator. SSNum indicates sum of squares numerator. SSDen indicates sum of squares
denominator. η2g indicates generalized eta-squared.
No main effects were identified for either CS-type [F(1,31) = 0.506, p = .482, η2 =.001],
or block-type [F(1,31) = 0.130, p = .721, η2 =.0004] and no interaction effects were identified for
CS-type by attentional target [F(1,39) = 2.67, p = .112, η2 = .0007], CS-type by block-type
[F(1,39) = 1.40, p = 0.24, η2 = .001], or attentional target by block-type [F(1,39) = 0.63, p =
.434, η2 = .001]. No three-way interactions were found in SCR [F(1,39) = 0.10, p = .752, η2 =
.00009].
Two post-hoc planned comparisons were evaluated to test the prediction that distraction
reduces the SCR response to the CS+, one for the External Distraction blocks and the other for
the Internal Distraction blocks. We observed a significant reduction in SCR during the External
Distraction blocks during the CS+ attend place condition compared to the CS+ attend face
condition, t(31) = -2.501, p = .018, d = 0.42. However, during the Internal Distraction blocks
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CS+ imagine place did not produce a significant reduction in SCR versus the CS+ attend face
condition, t(31) = 1.373, p = .180, d = 0.15.
Likert Results
Self-Reported Fear
An initial comparison of CS+ face-alone, CS- face-alone, and place-alone images using a
1-way within-subjects ANOVA demonstrated the presence of the differential conditioning
(Figure 1.3a) into the experimental phase [F(2,39) = 130.34, p < .001, η2 = .77]. Specifically,
pairwise comparisons showed that the CS+ (M = 5.4, SD = 1.56) elicited significantly higher
self-reported fear than either the CS- (M = 1.7, SD = 1.20), t(39) = 11.56, p < .001, d = 2.60, or
the place-alone images (M = 1.6, SD = 0.88), t(39) = 11.56, p < .001, d = 2.95. No significant
difference in reported fear were found between CS- and place-alone images, t(39) = 0.514, p =
.610, d = 0.095.
Critically, the analysis of self-reported fear during the presentation of the composite
images found that the use of both visual and imagined distracters successfully down-regulated
the conditioned fear response (Figure 1.3b). Likert responses during composite image
presentation were analyzed using a repeated-measures 2x2x2 ANOVA, with CS-type (CS+, CS), attentional target (Attend Face, Attend/Imagine Place), and block-type (External, Internal) as
within-subject variables. This revealed a significant three-way interaction [F(1,39) = 4.15, p =
.048, η2 = .002]. Follow-up pairwise comparisons revealed significantly higher self-reported fear
for the CS+ compared to the CS- in the following instruction-specific pairs: External Distraction
Attend Face: t(39) = 6.17, p < .001, d = 1.07; External Distraction Attend Place: t(39) = 6.44, p <
.001, d = 1.16; Internal Distraction Attend Face: t(39) = 7.74, p < .001, d = 1.45; and Internal
Distraction Attend Place: t(39) = 5.81, p < .001, d = 1.07.
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Figure 1.3. Effects of stimulus type on self-reported fear (a); CS-type, attentional target, and
block-type on self-reported fear (b); attentional target and block-type on self-reported task
difficulty (c); and CS-type and attentional target on self-reported task difficulty (d) in the
Regulation Phase. Error bars show 95% confidence interval. Dots represent number of
participants reporting a given value.
We observed evidence of significant down-regulation of self-reported fear in both the
External Distraction and Internal Distraction blocks. Specifically, pairwise comparisons revealed
that self-reported fear was significantly greater in the CS+ Attend Face compared to the CS+
Attend Place trials in both the External, t(39) = 2.42, p = .020, d = 0.24, and the Internal, t(39) =
23

3.09, p = .004, d = 0.32, block types. No significant differences were found between CSconditions. We also observed main effects of CS-type [F(1,39) = 61.84, p < .001, η2 = .26] and
attentional target [F(1,39) = 14.76, p < .001, η2 = .01]. No main effect of block-type [F(1,39) =
1.77, p = .191, η2 = .002], CS-type by attentional target interaction [F(1,39) = 3.29, p = .077, η2 =
.004], CS-type by block-type interaction [F(1,39) = 0.23, p = .637, η2 = .0003], or attentional
target by block-type interaction [F(1,39) = 0.31, p = .582, η2 = .0002] was observed.
Table 1.2. Study 1 ANOVA Results, Self-Reported Fear in Regulation Phases
Predictor
(Intercept)
CS
Target
Block
CS x Target
CS x Block
Target x
Block
CS x Target
x Block

dfNum
1
1
1
1
1
1

dfDen
39
39
39
39
39
39

1

39

1

39

F
188.37
61.84
14.76
1.77
3.29
0.23

p
.000
.000
.000
.191
.077
.637

η2g
.73
.26
.01
.00
.00
.00

0.15 19.35

0.31

.582

.00

1.25 11.75

4.15

.048

.00

SSNum
2116.65
281.25
10.88
1.95
2.81
0.20

SSDen
438.22
177.38
28.75
43.05
33.31
34.55

Note. dfNum indicates degrees of freedom numerator. dfDen indicates degrees of freedom
denominator. SSNum indicates sum of squares numerator. SSDen indicates sum of squares
denominator. η2g indicates generalized eta-squared.
Self-Reported Difficulty.
A second repeated-measures 2x2x2 ANOVA, with CS-type (CS+, CS-), attentional target
(face, place), and block-type (External, Internal) as within-subject variables was conducted to
compare reported difficulty of attending/imagining the target in each condition. Notably, this
revealed two significant interaction effects, an attentional target by block-type interaction
[F(1,39) = 6.27, p = .017, η2 = .01] and a CS-type by attentional target interaction [F(1,39) =
4.37, p = .004, η2 = .004].
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Table 1.3 Study 1 ANOVA Results, Self-Reported Task Difficulty in Regulation Phases
Predictor
(Intercept)
CS
Target
Block
CS x Target
CS x Block
Target x
Block
CS x Target
x Block

dfNum
1
1
1
1
1
1

dfDen
39
39
39
39
39
39

1

39

1

39

F
265.73
11.26
13.66
1.28
4.37
0.11

p
.000
.002
.001
.264
.043
.746

η2g
.74
.04
.06
.00
.00
.00

10.33 64.26

6.27

.017

.01

0.41 35.31

0.46

.503

.00

SSNum
2653.63
36.79
59.08
2.36
4.16
0.09

SSDen
389.46
127.43
168.64
71.86
37.18
34.75

Note. dfNum indicates degrees of freedom numerator. dfDen indicates degrees of freedom
denominator. SSNum indicates sum of squares numerator. SSDen indicates sum of squares
denominator. η2g indicates generalized eta-squared.
Regarding the first, collapsing across CS-type, imagining the place versus attending to
the faces was proportionately more difficult (i.e., during the Internal Distraction blocks) than
attending to the place versus attending to the face during the External Distraction blocks (Figure
1.3c). Specifically, during the Internal Distraction blocks, difficulty was greater for the Imagine
Place versus the Attend Face condition, t(39) = -4.19, p < .001, d = 0.79. During the External
Distraction blocks, no difference in difficulty between the Attend Place versus Attend Face
condition was found, t(39) = -1.99, p = .054, d = 0.35. Additionally, attending to the face stimuli
was not significantly more difficult between block-types, t(39) = 1.17, p = .249, d = 0.14, while
attending/imagining the place stimuli was more difficult in the Internal block, t(39) = -2.14, p =
.039, d = 0.33.
Regarding the second interaction, collapsing across block-type, attending/imaging the
place was harder than attending to the face in the presence of the CS+, but not in the presence of
the CS- (Figure 1.3d). Specifically, paired-samples t-tests showed significantly higher difficulty
for attending/imagining the distracter in the presence of CS+, t(39) = -4.31, p < .001, d = 0.56,
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but no significant differences in difficulty were observed between attentional targets in the
presence of the CS-, t(39) = -1.82, p = .077, d = 0.31. Additionally, task difficulty was higher in
the presence of the CS+ than the CS- when attending to either the face, t(39) = 2.84, p = .007, d
= 0.42, or place stimuli, t(39) = 3.78, p < .001, d = 0.70. We also observed main effects of CStype [F(1,39) = 11.26, p = .002, η2 = .04], and attentional target [F(1,39) = 13.66, p < .001, η2 =
.06]. No main effect of block-type was identified [F(1,39) = 1.28, p = .264, η2 = .003], nor was
there a CS-type by block-type [F(1,39) = .106, p = .75, η2 = .0001] or three-way interactions in
reported difficulty [F(1,39) = 0.46, p = .503, η2 = .0004].
Self-Reported Imagery Vividness
Reported vividness of visual imagery was compared via paired-samples t-test.
Participants reported higher vividness while visualizing the distracter in the presence of the CS+
than in the presence of the CS-, t(42) = 2.158, p = .037, d = 0.23.

DISCUSSION
The goal of this study was to determine the effectiveness of external (object-based)
attention and internal distraction (i.e., mental imagery) as distraction-based emotion regulation
strategies for differential fear conditioning. Consistent with our primary prediction, we found
evidence that both external distraction and mental imagery-based distraction can successfully
down-regulate differential fear conditioning as measured with self-report. The SCR results were
less clear overall, though provided independent confirmation of the acquisition of differential
fear conditioning and provided partial support for the effectiveness of external distraction in the
down-regulation of the SCR response. Additionally, we also observed that distraction by mental
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imagery required greater effort to perform generally, which is consistent with our secondary
prediction
The self-reported fear ratings supported the primary hypothesis that differential fear
conditioning can be down-regulated using both external and internal distraction. First, the selfreported fear towards the faces and places alone indicated that differential conditioning persisted
into the regulation phase. Second, during the regulation phase, we observed significantly lower
fear in response to CS+ composite images when attending to or imagining the places versus to
attending to the CS+ face compared to compositive images that included the CS-. This indicates
that both object-based and mental imagery-based distracters effectively lower subjective
differential fear. This is consistent with previous work demonstrating that object-based, external,
distraction can suppress the impact of a fear conditioning image on perceptual processing and
behavior (Yates et al., 2010). Furthermore, the internal distraction findings are consistent with
Greening et al. (2021), which observed that mental imagery of a CS- while viewing a CS+ could
down-regulate self-reported fear. Our self-reported fear findings indicate that an imagined
distractor can reduce fear comparably to an object-based distracter. However, the self-reported
fear findings do not rule out the possibility that, all else being equal, internal distraction requires
greater effort to obtain similar outcomes.
Compared to visual perception, mental imagery is associated with increased
frontoparietal activity (Dijkstra, Bosch, & van Gerven, 2019; Ganis et al., 2004; Greening et al.,
2021) in regions associated with mental effort or cognitive demand (Duncan, 2010). This greater
degree of frontoparietal activity associated with imagery is consistent with the pattern of reported
difficulty found by our study. Specifically, the observed attentional target by block-type
interaction suggests that internal distraction is generally more difficult than external distraction
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compared to attending to faces, irrespective of CS-type (i.e., either the CS+ or CS- face).
Specifically, higher self-reported task difficulty was observed for imagined distraction compared
to attending to either the CS+ and CS- face, while external distraction trials only found this
difference in the presence of the CS+. We also observed a CS-type by attentional target
interaction such that the presence of the CS+ resulted in greater distraction task difficulty. As
emotional stimuli are highly attentionally engaging, the increased difficulty of the task may
reflect the higher effort necessary to disengage from the CS+ face than the emotionally neutral
CS- (Eippert, Gamer, & Buchel, 2012; Grégoire, Kim, & Anderson, 2020). In addition to the
previous literature on distraction, our results indicate that distraction using mental imagery is
more difficult than object-based distraction, while distracting in the presence of a fearful
stimulus was found to be more difficult generally.
Regarding the SCR data, the effects of successful differential conditioning were observed
in both the conditioning phase and the face-alone trials of the regulation phases. This is
consistent with the similar to the conditioning phases of previous studies of fear conditioning and
object-based distraction (Lim & Pessoa, 2008; Yates et al., 2010). The SCR results, however,
were less clear during the composite image trials. We did observe a main effect of attentional
target such that SCR levels were generally lower while attending to or imagining the distracter
than attending to the face stimuli, irrespective of CS-type. We did not observe the predicted twoway, CS-type by attentional target, interaction. Neither Yates et al. (2010), nor Lim et al. (2008)
reported in their studies of external object-based distraction whether or not SCR was modulated
as a function of attentional load. Thus, it is unclear whether or not our lack of an interaction is
consistent with previous research. Nevertheless, we did observe in our planned comparisons that
in the External Distraction blocks, attention to the place image in the presence of the CS+ could
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significantly reduce the SCR compared to attend face CS+ trials. This down-regulation of SCR is
similar to that observed by Delgado et al. (2008) and Greening et al. (2021), both of which used
forms of internal distraction. Conversely, we did not observe the same evidence of SCR downregulation in our Internal Distraction blocks. One possibility in the present study is that the
layered compositive images reduced the saliency of the face stimuli thereby reducing the CS
discriminability to some degree. Future research is required to determine whether salience in this
composite image paradigm represents a meaningful confound. This could be addressed by using
more visually distinct stimuli, such as a male versus female face as in Lim et al. (2008), or using
objects and animals (Dunsmoor, Kroes, Braren, & Phelps, 2017).
Our findings are broadly consistent with the biased-competition model and the role for
attention selection in the regulation of emotion (Bishop, 2008; Blair & Mitchell, 2009).
Moreover, the self-reported findings in particular are consistent with Greening et al. (2021),
which found that mental imagery can disrupt differential condition by inhibiting the
representation of the CS+ in early regions of the ventral visual stream. However, given the use of
complex objects (i.e., faces and places) and the lack of brain imaging measures in the current
study, future research is required to determine if our observed results of down-regulation can be
attributed to inhibition of the representation of the CS+ in the ventral visual stream (Cohen &
Tong, 2015).
While our findings regarding mental imagery as an internal distracter are relevant to the
impact of distraction on emotional reactivity, they may also have implications for other areas of
emotion regulation. Existing assumptions regarding cognitive reappraisal assert that the
mechanism of reappraisal involves adjusting one’s interpretation of a scene by modifying the
meaning of the scene (McRae et al., 2012). For example, imagining either a celebration or a
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funeral to change the emotion depicted in an image of crying people. However, there are some
findings indicate that mental imagery could play a role in cognitive reappraisal and the
adjustments of meaning (Ochsner, Silvers, & Buhle, 2012; Opitz, Cavanagh, & Urry, 2015), just
as the example above suggests. For example, in their meta-analysis of cognitive reappraisal,
Ochsner et al. (2012) observed greater activation during reappraisal in aspects of the temporal
and occipital cortices. Other research with cognitive reappraisal has observed the modulation of
regions associated with visual processing, which might reflect processes of goal-directed
attention (Greening, Lee, & Mather, 2014), though the existing literature does not disentangle the
potential contributions of external attention from internal attention in the reappraisal process.
Together with the current findings, we speculate that imagined scenes or the addition of novel
imagined elements to a scene contributes to emotional down-regulation via mechanisms of goaldirected attentional selection in the occipitotemporal lobes. Future research using brain imaging
methods will be necessary to identify the neural correlates of both internal and external
distraction, as well as where and how they contribute to various emotion regulation strategies
ranging from distraction to forms of cognitive reappraisal.
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CHAPTER 2. EFFICACY AND NEURAL BASIS OF IMAGINED
DISTRACTERS
Attention control has an established history as an effective means of modulating emotion
(Greening, Lee, & Mather, 2014; Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Ochsner et al., 2012). Top-down
attention selection can deprioritize processing of an emotional stimulus in favor of an attended
distracter, reducing the impact of the emotional stimulus (Pessoa et al., 2002). While distraction
tasks commonly rely on visual distractors to redirect attentional resources (Buhle et al, 2014;
Oschner et al., 2012), distraction using mental imagery is poorly specified in comparison to
visual distraction (Martins et al., 2015; Oliver & Page, 2008; Strauss et al., 2016). This study
aims to compare the efficacy and neural correlates of object-based (external) and mental
imagery-based (internal) distraction in emotion regulation.
Fear research commonly relies on standardized affective images, such as the IAPS set by
Lang, Bradley, and Cuthbert (2008). While broadly effective, emotion-inducing scenes are
limited by the range of idiosyncratic responses they elicit (Barke et al., 2012; Ito & Cacioppo,
2005). Differential fear conditioning offers an alternative method for establishing a reliable fear
response. By pairing a neutral conditioned stimulus (CS+) with an aversive unconditioned
stimulus (US) such as a mild shock. If successful, the resulting negative stimulus can be
compared to a neutral control (CS-). Meta-analysis of previous research on the neural correlates
of fear acquisition and processing has shown largest effect sizes in the bilateral anterior insula,
but does not identify significant involvement by the amygdala (Fullana et al., 2016).
Affective image stimuli have been shown to induce elevated BOLD activity in the
amygdala associated with fear processing (Anders, Lotze, Erb, Grodd, & Birbaumer, 2004;
Sabatinelli, Bradley, Fitzsimmons, & Lang, 2005). However, emotion processing and regulation
in the case of conditioned stimuli has been shown to correlate with elevated BOLD activity in the
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left anterior insula (Buhle et al., 2014; Delgado et al., 2008; M A Fullana et al., 2015). As this
study focuses on regulation of conditioned fear, we anticipate that regulatory effects will
correlate with activity in the anterior insula. While object-based stimuli (External) and mental
imagery-based stimuli (Internal) originate from different sources, research indicates that both
form similar mental representations (Etkin et al., 2015; Romero-Rebollar, Jiménez-Ángeles,
Dragustinovis-Ruiz, & Medina-Bañuelos, 2016). We hypothesize that both types of distracter
will influence emotion processing similarly.
Existing models of interaction between cognitive emotion regulation tasks and the
experience of emotion suggest that activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex introduces a
down-regulatory effect on emotion processing in the amygdala and insula by way of inhibitory
influence through the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Delgado et al., 2008). Maintenance of
visually presented fear stimuli should require the continued engagement of visual processing and
associative networks. The biased competition model suggests that top-down attentional control
can bias visual processing of an attended stimulus over that of an unattended stimulus, despite
the unattended stimulus having a higher emotional impact (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Pessoa et
al., 2002). We predict lower reported fear during both external and internal distraction tasks than
when attending to conditioned fear images. We expect this effect to be reflected by
accompanying changes in BOLD activity in the aIn.

METHODS
Participants
Twenty-nine undergraduate and graduate participants (22 female), aged 18-30, were
recruited from pre-screened volunteer lists gathered at Louisiana State University. Participants
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reported no presence or history of psychological or neurological disorders. One participant
withdrew from the study partway through the MRI procedure and was excluded from analysis.
An additional three participants were excluded from analysis due to failure to complete more
than two thirds of the planned experimental trials, resulting in a final sample of 25 participants.
All participants gave written informed consent and the protocol was approved by the Louisiana
State University institutional review board.
Materials
Each participant completed four phases of the experiment (Habituation, Fear
Conditioning, Regulation (External/Internal Distractor), and Functional Localizer). Each phase
presented combinations of object-based and mental imagery-based stimuli. Two face images
were used for the conditioned stimuli. Greyscale images of two males with neutral expressions
were taken from the Cohn-Kanade emotional faces database. The face images had the
background removed and were cropped to show only the head from hairline to chin. Two place
images (one house and one building) were used as distractors. The place images were also
greyscale and had the backgrounds removed such that only a building or house was visible.
Faces were selected as the conditioning stimuli due to their reliable representation in the fusiform
face area (FFA) (Ghuman et al., 2014; Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997), while place
images were used as distractors due to the ease of identifying place processing in the
parahippocampal place area (PPA) (Epstein, Harris, Stanley, & Kanwisher, 1999). From these
base images, an additional set of composite face-place images were generated from all possible
face/place pairings. For the purposes of the Internal Distraction blocks, the composite images
contained one of the two faces along with a scrambled place image. Scrambled images were
generated in Matlab by dividing place images into a grid of 40x40px and scrambling grid blocks.
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The purpose of including the scrambled place rather than simply having the face alone was to
produce a resulting composite image with the same visual complexity as those used in the
External Distraction blocks.
In our fear conditioning procedure, one face served as the conditioned stimulus (CS+)
and was paired with the unconditioned stimulus (US; a mild shock to the distal phalanges of the
pointer and middle fingers of the left hand), while the second face was never paired with shock
(CS-). Which face image served as CS+ was counterbalanced across participants. The mild
(Mintensity = 6 mA, SD = 11.03, range: 1.00-50.00 mA) shock was delivered using a BIOPAC

STMISOC module with MR-compatible leads and electrodes. Shock duration was 500ms at
50Hz. During the Internal Distraction Task participants were cued to imagine either a house or
place using an auditory instruction. These auditory instructions were created using TextAloud
text-to-speech software (Language: British English, Voice: Emma, Speed: Medium) to produce
2-second spoken clip and delivered during scanning using MRI-compatible insert earphones.
Design and Procedure
Habituation
Once in the scanner, participants underwent a habituation run comprising the selected
face and place images. Composite images were not included in habituation. This phase was
necessary to both ensure a neutral baseline for the images to be used in conditioning, and to
expose participants to the distractor images that they would later be instructed to mentally image.
Habituation included 2 presentations of each image, for a total of 8 trials. After an initial twosecond fixation dot, each trial consisted of a 4-second image presentation followed by a 14second inter-trial interval (ITI) with fixation dot. The total duration of the habituation run was
144 seconds.
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Fear Conditioning Acquisition
After habituation, participants performed a brief threshold task in which their shock level
was determined for the remainder of the study. Participants were instructed to report a shock’s
intensity as “not uncomfortable”, “uncomfortable”, or “painful.” A participant’s shock level was
established at the highest intensity rated “uncomfortable” but not painful.
Having established an aversive shock threshold, participants underwent one run of fear
conditioning acquisition (Figure 2.1a).

Figure 2.1. Experiment structure and example stimuli for Conditioning and Regulation Phases.
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One of the two face images was chosen at random to be the CS+, while the remaining
face image was designated as the CS-. As with habituation, the conditioning phase contained no
instructions on a per-trial basis, only the direction to keep their eyes on the fixation point at the
center of the screen and to pay attention. In this phase, participants viewed both CS+ and CS- in
a randomized series. 60% of CS+ presentations were paired with the shock stimulus, while the
CS- face was never accompanied by a shock. Each face image was presented 10 times for 20
total presentations, 4 CS+ without shock, 6 CS+ with shock, and 10 CS-. Following the initial 2second fixation dot, each trial comprised a 4-second image presentation, followed by a 14second ITI with fixation dot. In shock trials, a 500ms shock was coterminous with the end of the
image presentation. The full duration of the conditioning task was 360 seconds.
Emotion Regulation Task
After conditioning, participants began the primary experimental phase (Figure 2.1b). This
phase comprised two independent block types, External Distraction Task blocks and Internal
Distraction Task blocks (Figure 2.1). Block types were presented in alternating order with a
random starting type, meaning a participant could start with either an External or Internal
Distraction block. In both External and Internal Distraction Task block types, participants viewed
series of faces, places, and composite face-place images paired with audio instructions.
In the External Distraction Task, each trial began with the auditory instruction (2
seconds) to either “Attend House,” “Attend Building,” or “Attend Face.” A fixation dot was
present during this section. The auditory instruction was followed by the presentation of either a
face alone, a place alone, or a composite image (4 seconds). Each trial ended in a 12-second ITI
with fixation dot. Blocks comprised 2 CS+ alone, 2 CS- alone, 2 House alone, 2 Building alone,
1 CS+ alone with reinforcing shock, and 8 composite trials (1 for each possible combination of
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CS, Distractor, and Instruction) for a total of 17 trials per block. The duration of each block was
308 seconds.
The Internal Distraction Task was similar to the External Distraction Task, with the only
difference being the specific auditory instructions and the nature of the composite images. The
auditory instructions in the Internal Distraction Task direct the participant to either “Attend
Face,” “Imagine House,” or “Imagine Building.” The composite images comprised one face and
one scrambled-place image and the instructions became either “attend face,” “imagine house,” or
“imagine building.” In “attend” conditions, participants viewed the presented image and
instructed to direct attention only to the visible face or place, while ignoring other elements. In
the “imagine” conditions, participants were instructed to imagine the House or Building portion
while still viewing the scrambled composite image. Image distribution consisted of 2 of each
CS+ and CS- alone images, 2 of each place distractor, and 8 composite images for each
combination of CS/Distractor/Instruction. An additional CS+ with shock was included as a
conditioning reinforcement in each block for a total of 17 trials per block. Each experimental
block was 306 seconds in length.
Functional Localizer
To independently localize the FFA and PPA for analysis, a single functional localizer run
was conducted. Unlike the previous phases, a new set of 20 face and 20 place images was drawn
from the same face and place stimulus sets as those used throughout the study. Faces and places
were divided into type-specific blocks of rapidly presented images. Each image was visible for
0.75 seconds with a 0.25 second ISI. Each block was presented five times in alternating order
with a 15 second ITI between face and place blocks for a total runtime of 356 seconds
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Self-report measures
At the end of the experiment, participants were given a set of 7-point Likert scales
recording self-reported ratings on fear response to each condition, difficulty of regulation by
condition, and the vividness of the imagined distractors in the Internal Distraction Task. This set
of data were analyzed in R to compare self-reported fear response and task difficulty.
SCR Method and Analysis
Additional Skin Conductance Response (SCR) measures were recorded during the fear
conditioning phase and all External and Internal Regulation phases. SCR was not recorded
during either Habituation or the Functional Localizer. SCR measures were recorded using a
BIOPAC MP-150 data acquisition system sampling at 2000Hz from MR-compatible electrodes
placed on the fourth and fifth digit of the non-dominant hand. SCR data were processed in
AcqKnowledge and Matlab software. In all phases, with the exception of the Functional
Localizer, image presentations lasted for four seconds, following a two second audio cue and
followed by a twelve second ITI. This timing allowed for a return to baseline BOLD response
following the onset of a shock stimulus. Shock trials (both conditioning and reinforcement) were
excluded from SCR analysis.
Gathered SCR data were detrended and smoothed with a median filter over 50 samples to
reduce noise generated by the MRI, then down-sampled to 100Hz. A time window from 1.0-6.5
seconds after onset was extracted for each SCR epoch and baseline-corrected against the mean
signal from one second before the epoch onset. Within this window, trials with peak SCR values
above baseline were extracted and all other trials were zeroed. Three participants experienced
SCR malfunctions that resulted in incomplete SCR recordings during the experimental phases
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and could not be included in analysis. As fMRI data and Likert reports for these participants
were unaffected, they were subsequently included in those analyses.
FMRI Acquisition and Analysis
MRI Acquisition
Data for fMRI analyses were gathered using a 3T GE Discovery MR750w research
scanner and 36-channel head coil at Pennington Biomedical Research Center. Anatomical
imaging used a 256x256 T1-weighted protocol with 1mm slice thickness at 1.0x1.0 in-plane
voxel resolution for 176 sagittal slices at a 10° flip angle. Functional image acquisition used a
single-shot gradient echo EPI sequence (TR = 2000ms, TE = 20ms, FOV = 22.4cm, flip angle =
90°, bandwidth = 7812.5 Hz/px, echo spacing = .578ms for 38 slices). Functional trials used an
in-plane voxel resolution of 3.0x3.0mm with a 3mm slice thickness in interleaved ascending
order. For both the Internal and External Distraction Task, each block had 154 volumes. Blocks
for the Fear Conditioning phase ran for 181 volumes, while the Functional Localizer phase ran
for 179 volumes. Each block included an initial three-volume set of dummy volumes that were
not included in the analysis.
Preprocessing and Whole-brain Univariate Analysis
FMRI Expert Analysis Tool (FEAT) version 6.00 within the FSL software package was
used to perform analysis of the gathered fMRI data. Prior to analysis, pre-statistical processing
was conducted on the functional and structural data. Brain extraction was performed on
anatomical trials using BET. Functional trials underwent motion correction using MCFLIRT,
slice-timing correction using Fourier-space time-series phase-shifting, 7mm FWHM spatial
smoothing, and 100s high-pass temporal filtering (Gaussian-weighted least-squares straight line
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fitting). FSL’s motion outliers function was used to generate motion correction parameters for
nuisance regressors in any volume with >0.9mm framewise displacement.
At the block-wise level (lvl 1), the study used a double-gamma hemodynamic response
function (HRF) to convolve each condition of interest. A model was generated for the temporal
derivates of each condition from onset to offset of the image presentation. This model included
the previously noted nuisance regressors for motion and a shock regressor for the reinforcement
trial present in each External and Internal Distraction block. These lower-level contrasts were
combined into subsequent participant level (lvl 2) fixed-effects analyses. Group-level (lvl 3)
analyses were performed using FLAME 1+2 mixed effects modeling with automatic outlier
detection. Z-scores obtained from this analysis were thresholded at values of Z>2.3, reflecting a
cluster significance of p>0.05. BOLD data from the Functional Localizer and Conditioning phase
sets were analyzed separately using the same pre-processing but phase specific modelling of
relevant conditions. These phases underwent lvl 1 FEAT analysis, then level 3 fixed effects
modeling due to the presence of only one run per participant. In the functional localizer,
conditions were modeled at the run level by image presentation set (face or place), rather than on
an image-by-image basis due to the rapid speed of image presentation.
Region-of-Interest (ROI) Derivation and Analyses
ROIs were produced from both the Fear Conditioning Acquisition run (Left/Right
Amygdala, Left/Right Anterior Insula) and the Face/Place Functional Localizer run (Fusiform
Face Area (FFA), Parahippocampal Place Area (PPA), Occipital Face Area (OFA)). Masks for
the left and right aIn were generated from the clusters of highest activity in the bilateral insula
for ROI analyses of data from the regulation phase of the experiment. Single subject ROIs were
produced by first performing a group-level analysis to locate regions of elevated activity. The
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threshold for the group group-level data was then elevated to isolate discreet clusters of activity.
A mask was generated for each identified region using FLIRT and all voxels outside said mask
zeroed. The remaining voxel of highest activity for each experimental phase was then located. A
3mm sphere was masked around each identified peak voxel, and the mean value from this
spherical mask recorded for analysis. Mean BOLD values from the recorded peak spheres were
analyzed in R to determine changes in regional activity by condition.

RESULTS
Fear Conditioning
Self-report Measures
In order to test the success of differential fear conditioning to the CS+ versus the CS- and
the distractor stimuli (i.e., the house and building), we first evaluated the trials in which the faces
and places were viewed alone. Results indicated significantly higher reported fear ratings for the
CS+ conditioned face image (M = 4.81, SD = 1.72) then the CS- unconditioned face (M = 1.81,
SD = 1.33), t(25) = 7.36, p < .001, d = 1.95, or either House (M = 1.38, SD = 0.75) or Building
(M = 1.50, SD = 0.99) place images, t(25) = 8.38, p < .001, d = 2.58, t(25) = 7.59, p < .001, d =
2.36. No significant differences were found in fear ratings between the CS- and the place images,
t(25) = 1.96, p = 0.06, t(25) = 1.25, p = 0.22, or between the place images themselves, t(25) = 1.00, p = 0.33 (Figure 2.2).
SCR Results
The initial acquisition of a fear response to the CS+ face image was tested by comparing
peak SCR values during presentation of the CS+ and CS- faces in the conditioning phase. Trials
ending in a shock stimulus were excluded from this analysis. When viewing a CS+ face,
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participants exhibited significantly higher SCR levels than while viewing a CS- face, t(25) =
3.14, p < 0.01, d = 0.53, indicating successful acquisition of a conditioned fear response (Figure
2.2c).

Figure 2.2. Evidence of conditioned fear response persistent throughout regulation phase.
a) Self-reported fear across experimental conditions. Likert reports show a consistent effect by
conditioning, with higher reported fear in the presence of the CS+ face across conditions, and
lower reported fear during both internal and external distraction tasks. b) BOLD activity of
during CS+ > CS- face alone images during regulation phase, collapsed across session types.
Patterns of BOLD response indicate activation in networks associated with fear learning. c) GSR
measures of CS+ and CS- alone images during conditioning phase. d) GSR measures of CS+ and
CS- alone images during regulation phase. GSR recordings in the presence of only the CS+ and
CS- images indicate the continued presence of the conditioning effect into the regulation phase.

fMRI Results
Whole-brain univariate analysis during fear acquisition identified a canonical network of
elevated activity in the bilateral anterior insula, bilateral thalamus, bilateral caudate, left dACC,
and bilateral midbrain (Fullana et al., 2015). Activity in these regions was significantly greater
during viewing of the CS+ face than while viewing the CS- face. No regions were identified with
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significantly higher activity during viewing of the CS- face than the CS+ face.
Emotion Regulation Phase
Self-report Measures
In order to test our main prediction regarding the role of external versus internal
distraction in the regulation of differentially conditioned fear response we ran a 2x2x2 repeatedmeasures ANOVA on self-reported fear for the composite images, with CS-type (CS+, CS-),
attentional target (face, distractor), and block-type (External, Internal) as within-subject
variables. Results show a main effect of CS, with CS+ faces rated significantly higher than CSfaces across conditions [F(1,22) = 13.15, p = .001, ηG2 = 0.13] (Figure 2.2a). This supports the
continued efficacy of the conditioning paradigm throughout the experiment. Another main effect
of attentional target was also identified, with participants reporting lower fear when attending to
a distractor [F(1,22) = 4.99, p = .036, ηG2 = 0.026], supporting the hypothesis that both Internal
and External Distraction conditions would regulate the fear response.
Table 2.1. Study 2 ANOVA Results, Self-Reported Fear in Regulation Phases
Predictor
(Intercept)
CS
Target
Block
CS x Target
CS x Block
Target x
Block
CS x Target
x Block

dfNum
1
1
1
1
1
1

dfDen
22
22
22
22
22
22

1

22

1

22

F
162.71
13.15
4.99
2.28
1.02
2.19

p
.000
.001
.036
.145
.324
.153

η2g
.76
.13
.03
.01
.00
.00

1.57 12.80

2.70

.115

.00

0.14

0.39

.541

.00

SSNum
1056.96
53.27
9.14
1.96
0.66
1.57

SSDen
142.91
89.11
40.24
18.91
14.22
15.80

7.74

Note. dfNum indicates degrees of freedom numerator. dfDen indicates degrees of freedom
denominator. SSNum indicates sum of squares numerator. SSDen indicates sum of squares
denominator. η2g indicates generalized eta-squared.

43

An additional 2(CS-type)x2(attentional target)x2(block-type) ANOVA on self-reported
difficulty for the composite images was conducted to compare difficulty ratings across
conditions.

Figure 2.3. Self-reported difficulty across conditions. A main effect of target of attention was
identified, with significantly higher difficulty reported in the Internal than the External “attend
place” condition.
Table 2.2. Study 2 ANOVA Results, Self-Reported Task Difficulty in Regulation Phases
Predictor
(Intercept)
CS
Target
Block
CS x Target
CS x Block
Target x
Block
CS x Target
x Block

dfNum
1
1
1
1
1
1

dfDen
22
22
22
22
22
22

1

22

1

22

F
212.90
1.67
5.78
3.94
0.16
2.79

p
.000
.210
.025
.060
.693
.109

η2g
.73
.01
.04
.02
.00
.00

1.57 50.30

0.69

.416

.00

4.57 25.30

3.97

.059

.01

SSNum
1095.66
5.92
18.92
6.66
0.14
1.22

SSDen
113.22
77.96
71.96
37.22
18.74
9.65

Note. dfNum indicates degrees of freedom numerator. dfDen indicates degrees of freedom
denominator. SSNum indicates sum of squares numerator. SSDen indicates sum of squares
denominator. η2g indicates generalized eta-squared.
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A main effect of attentional target was identified [F(1,22) = 5.78, p= .025, ηG2 = 0.45].
Pairwise comparisons also indicated significantly higher reported difficulty in attending to the
internal distracter in the presence of the CS+ (M = 3.43, SD = 1.73) than attending to the external
distracter in the presence of the CS+ (M = 3.52, SD = 1.86), t(22) = -2.41, p = 0.025, d = 0.71.
SCR Results
A planned comparison between CS+ and CS- alone images from this phase indicates that
the CS+ and CS- faces did retain the effects of fear conditioning in the absence of a distraction
image, t(24) = 2.11, p = .046, d = 0.46 (Figure 2.2d). SCR data during the Internal and External
Distraction conditions were also analyzed using the previous 2(CS-type)x2(attentional
target)x2(block-type) ANOVA. An interaction effect of target of attention by block-type was
identified [F(1,22) = 7.87, p = .010, ηG2 = 0.010].
Table 2.3. Study 2 ANOVA Results, GSR Values in Regulation Phases
Predictor
(Intercept)
CS
Target
Block
CS x Target
CS x Block
Target x
Block
CS x Target
x Block

dfNum
1
1
1
1
1
1

dfDen
24
24
24
24
24
24

SSNum
5.19
0.01
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.01

1

24

0.04

1

24

0.00

F
50.26
1.07
2.97
0.07
0.21
1.91

p
.000
.312
.097
.789
.652
.180

η2g
.59
.00
.01
.00
.00
.00

0.12

7.87

.010

.01

0.11

0.28

.604

.00

SSDen
2.48
0.34
0.17
0.15
0.10
0.11

Note. dfNum indicates degrees of freedom numerator. dfDen indicates degrees of freedom
denominator. SSNum indicates sum of squares numerator. SSDen indicates sum of squares
denominator. η2g indicates generalized eta-squared.

Paired t-tests revealed that, collapsed across CS-type, SCR was significantly higher while
attending the face image (M = 0.19, SD = 0.18) than while attending the place image (M = 0.14,
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SD = 0.11) in External trials, t(49) = 2.77, p = .008, d = 0.33, but not significantly different
between Internal face (M = 0.16, SD = 0.12) and place (M = 0.16, SD = 0.12) trials, t(49) = 0.76, p = .453.
fMRI Results, ROI Analyses
Similar to the self-report and SCR data, we first evaluated the neural response the face
and place alone trials, followed by independent analyses for the trials involving the composite
images. Regions were targeted based on their theoretical involvement in fear intensity or
regulation. Given the involvement of the right and left aIn as the regions with the largest
differential fear conditioning effects identified in the meta-analysis of Fullana et al (2016), we
interrogated the regions to evaluate the impact of external and internal attention on the neural
representation of differential fear conditioning The PPA and FFA were targeted due to their
assumed involvement in place and face representation during the distraction paradigm (Epstein et
al., 1999; Ghuman et al., 2014).
Anterior Insula. Prior to analyzing composite trials, face and place alone images were
compared to confirm the persistence of differential conditioning. Comparison between CS+ (M =
2.71, SD = 2.73), CS- (M = 0.88, SD = 1.26), and place alone (M = 1.38, SD = 1.56) “view”
conditions in the left aIn showed that BOLD activity during the CS+ condition was higher than
when during either the CS-, t(47) = 4.56, p < .001, d = 0.86, or place alone, t(47) = 4.03, p <
.001, d = 0.58, conditions. There was also a difference identified between CS- and place alone
images, t(47) = -2.11, p = .041, d = 0.35, with CS- showing lower left aIn activity than the place
alone condition.
A 2(CS-type)x2(attentional target)x2(block-type) ANOVA found critical interaction
effects of CS by attentional target [F(1,23) = 5.85, p = .024, ηG2 = 0.008] and target of attention
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by block-type [F(1,23) = 11.23, p = .003, ηG2 = 0.023]. Regarding the first interaction, paired ttests showed significantly higher BOLD activity collapsed across External and Internal sessions
while viewing the CS+ compared to the CS- during attend face conditions, t(47) = 3.62, p = .001,
d = 0.52, but not during attend place conditions, t(47) = 0.30, p = 0.768 (Figure 2.3c).

Figure 2.4. Left and Right anterior insula BOLD activity. Graphs a(Left) and d(Right) display
average peak sphere BOLD during attend CS+, CS- and Place alone conditions in the left and
right hemispheres, while Graphs b(Left) and e(Right) display average peak sphere BOLD
activation in the left insula during each composite attention condition. Notable is the elevated
activity during the presence of the CS+, both in the CS+ alone condition, and in composite
conditions when the participant is instructed to attend to the CS+ stimulus. Graphs c(Left) and
f(Right) displays BOLD activity collapsed across External/Internal trials. Mean peak BOLD
values localized in the left anterior insula collapsed across internal and external sessions. The
presence of the conditioning effect is discernable when attending to the face stimulus, but absent
when attending to the distracter.
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This supports that the conditioning effect is present when the face is the attentional target,
but is no longer discernable when attention is directed toward the distractor.
Table 2.4. Study 2 ANOVA results, Left aIns BOLD Activity in Regulation Phases
Predictor
(Intercept)
CS
Target
Block
CS x Target
CS x Block
Target x
Block
CS x Target
x Block

dfNum
1
1
1
1
1
1

dfDen
23
23
23
23
23
23

1

23

1

23

F
36.83
9.27
13.02
8.91
5.85
0.31

p
.000
.006
.001
.007
.024
.583

η2g
.52
.01
.03
.02
.01
.00

18.87 38.64

11.23

.003

.02

0.14 50.55

0.06

.801

.00

SSNum
863.88
9.60
27.44
19.11
6.61
0.42

SSDen
539.46
23.83
48.48
49.33
25.97
30.99

Note. dfNum indicates degrees of freedom numerator. dfDen indicates degrees of freedom
denominator. SSNum indicates sum of squares numerator. SSDen indicates sum of squares
denominator. η2g indicates generalized eta-squared.

Regarding the second interaction, paired t-tests showed significantly higher BOLD
activity collapsed across CS-type in the Internal trials while attending to the place (M = 3.13, SD
= 2.42) than while attending to the face (M = 1.75, SD = 2.13), t(47) = 4.74, p < .001, d = 0.61.
No significant differences were found between attending to External face (M = 1.74, SD = 2.02)
and place (M = 1.87, SD = 1.74) stimuli, t(47) = 0.50, p = .618. Main effects of attentional target
[F(1,23) = 13.02, p = .001, ηG2 = 0.033] and CS-type [F(1,23) = 9.27, p = .006, ηG2 = 0.012],
matching findings from the behavioral data. An additional main effect of block-type was found
[F(1,23) = 8.909, p = .007, ηG2 = 0.023], indicating differences between Internal and External
distractors not identified in the subjective responses.
In the right aIn, analysis of the CS+ (M = 2.15, SD = 2.19), CS- (M = 1.05, SD = 1.59),
and place alone (M = 0.93, SD = 1.40) conditions showed significantly higher activation during
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the CS+ condition than either CS-, t(47) = 3.56, p = .001, d = 0.57, or place alone, t(47) = 4.32, p
< .001, d = 0.66, trials. There was no significant difference in activation between viewing the
CS- and the place alone images, t(47) = 0.55, p = .583. This indicates that differential
conditioning persisted into the regulation phase.
Applying the 2(CS-type)x2(attentional target)x2(block-type) ANOVA identified a critical
interaction effect of attentional target by block-type [F(1,23) = 6.35, p = .019, ηG2 = 0.023]. As
with the analysis of the left aIn, subsequent paired-subjects t-tests indicated significantly higher
peak activation while attending to the CS+ face compared to the CS- face collapsed across block
type, t(47) = 2.74, p = .009, d = 0.40, but no significant differences by CS-type when attending to
the distractor across session type, t(47)=0.26, p=0.796 (Figure 2.3f). A main effect of attentional
target was also identified [F(1,23) = 14.38, p < .001, ηG2 = 0.059].
Table 2.5. Study 2 ANOVA results, Right aIns BOLD Activity in Regulation Phases
Predictor
(Intercept)
CS
Target
Block
CS x Target
CS x Block
Target x
Block
CS x Target
x Block

dfNum
1
1
1
1
1
1

dfDen
23
23
23
23
23
23

1

23

1

23

F
50.79
2.80
14.38
2.61
3.93
1.49

p
.000
.108
.001
.120
.060
.235

η2g
.51
.01
.06
.01
.01
.00

12.91 46.76

6.35

.019

.02

0.78 20.43

0.88

.357

.00

SSNum
571.33
7.09
34.71
6.68
5.09
1.45

SSDen
258.72
58.24
55.54
58.96
29.80
22.42

Note. dfNum indicates degrees of freedom numerator. dfDen indicates degrees of freedom
denominator. SSNum indicates sum of squares numerator. SSDen indicates sum of squares
denominator. η2g indicates generalized eta-squared.

PPA, Single Image Conditions. In the left PPA, attend place alone trials (M = 4.93, SD
= 3.00) exhibited significantly higher BOLD activity than either attend CS+ (M = -1.73, SD =
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1.39), t(47) = -13.41, p < .001, d = 2.85, or CS- (M = -0.95, SD = 1.31), t(47) = -12.49, p < .001,
d = 2.54, alone trials. BOLD activity while attending to the CS+ alone condition was also
bilaterally lower than when attending to the CS- condition, t(47) = -3.234, p = .002, d = 0.58.

Figure 2.5. Bilateral PPA activity during single image and composite image conditions.
a,c) Average peak sphere BOLD during attend CS+, CS- and Place alone conditions.
b,d) Average peak sphere BOLD activation in the left insula during each composite attention
condition. Participants attending to a place image showed elevated BOLD activity in the PPA
while attending to place images in both External and Internal conditions. The FFA did not show
differentiation in activity between CS+ and CS- faces.

In the right PPA, attend place alone trials (M = 5.61, SD = 3.26) exhibited significantly
higher activity than either attend CS+ (M = -1.52, SD = 1.72), t(47) = -13.27, p < .001, d = 2.74,
or attend CS- (M = -0.81, SD = 1.47), t(47) = -13.69, p < .001, d = 2.54), alone trials. BOLD
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activity while attending to the CS+ alone condition was again lower than when attending to the
CS- condition, t(47) = -2.97, p = .005, d = 0.44.
PPA, Composite Conditions. PPA activity during composite trials was analyzed using
the same 2(CS-type)x2(attentional target)x2(block-type) ANOVA as previous regions. In the left
PPA, main effects of attentional target [F(1,23) = 33.26, p < .001, ηG2 = 0.18] and block-type
[F(1,23) = 32.69, p < .001, ηG2 = 0.14] were identified. A planned t-test showed significantly
higher levels of BOLD activity during the CS+ Internal attend distractor condition (M = 1.43, SD
= 2.09) than during the CS+ Internal attend face condition (M = -0.20, SD = 1.86), t(23) = 3.074, p = .005, d = 0.82.
Table 2.6. Study 2 ANOVA results, Left PPA BOLD Activity in Regulation Phases
Predictor
(Intercept)
CS
Target
Block
CS x Target
CS x Block
Target x
Block
CS x Target
x Block

dfNum
1
1
1
1
1
1

dfDen
23
23
23
23
23
23

1

23

1

23

F
25.90
0.03
33.26
32.69
0.04
0.98

p
.000
.857
.000
.000
.851
.332

η2g
.37
.00
.18
.14
.00
.00

5.38 29.53

4.19

.052

.01

1.02 41.52

0.56

.460

.00

SSNum
412.53
0.04
153.70
109.99
0.03
1.18

SSDen
366.41
30.57
106.28
77.38
18.99
27.71

Note. dfNum indicates degrees of freedom numerator. dfDen indicates degrees of freedom
denominator. SSNum indicates sum of squares numerator. SSDen indicates sum of squares
denominator. η2g indicates generalized eta-squared.

In the right PPA, an interaction effect of attentional target by block-type was identified
[F(1,23) = 7.34, p = .012, ηG2 = 0.017] (Figure 2.4b). Main effects of attentional target [F(1,23) =
60.92, p < .001, ηG2 = 0.13] and block-type [F(1,23) = 40.64, p < .001, ηG2 = 0.15] were also
identified. A planned t-test again showed significantly higher levels of BOLD activity during the
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CS+ Internal attend distractor condition (M = 1.47, SD = 2.04) than during the CS+ Internal
attend face condition (M = 0.47, SD = 2.22), t(23) = -2.94, p = .007, d = 0.47.
Table 2.7. Study 2 ANOVA results, Right PPA BOLD Activity in Regulation Phases
Predictor
(Intercept)
CS
Target
Block
CS x Target
CS x Block
Target x
Block
CS x Target
x Block

dfNum
1
1
1
1
1
1

dfDen
23
23
23
23
23
23

1

23

1

23

F
26.51
0.22
60.92
40.64
1.14
0.94

p
.000
.644
.000
.000
.297
.342

η2g
.44
.00
.13
.15
.00
.00

15.95 49.96

7.34

.012

.02

0.29 21.59

0.31

.586

.00

SSNum
705.17
0.34
131.54
158.13
1.13
1.33

SSDen
611.84
35.67
49.66
89.48
22.76
32.49

Note. dfNum indicates degrees of freedom numerator. dfDen indicates degrees of freedom
denominator. SSNum indicates sum of squares numerator. SSDen indicates sum of squares
denominator. η2g indicates generalized eta-squared.

Fusiform Face Area. BOLD activity in the FFA showed greater elevation during the
“view face” alone conditions for both CS+ (M = 3.96, SD = 2.51), t(47) = 6.35, p < .001, d =
0.68, and CS- (M = 4.08, SD = 2.43), t(47) = 7.57, p < .001, d = 0.74, when compared to the
“view place” alone (M = 2.33, SD = 2.30) condition. No significant differences were noted
between CS+ and CS- “attend face” conditions, t(47) = -1.35, p = .184. In the FFA, the same
2(CS-type)x2(attentional target)x2(block-type) repeated-measures ANOVA revealed an
interaction effect of attentional target by block-type [F(1,23) = 4.49, p = .045, ηG2 = 0.002].
Paired t-tests revealed that, collapsed across CS-type, BOLD activity was significantly higher
when attending to face (M = 4.41, SD = 2.74) images than place images (M = 3.57, SD =2.51) in
Internal trials, t(47) = 3.46, p = .001, d = 0.32, but not significantly different between face (M =
4.87, SD =2.85) and place (M = 4.51, SD =2.63) images in External trials, t(47) = 1.45, p = .153.
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Main effects were identified for attentional target [F(1,23) = 6.80, p = .016, ηG2 = 0.012] and
block-type [F(1,23) = 9.16, p = .006, ηG2 = 0.017]
Table 2.8. Study 2 ANOVA results, FFA BOLD Activity in Regulation Phases
Predictor
(Intercept)
CS
Target
Block
CS x Target
CS x Block
Target x
Block
CS x Target
x Block

dfNum
1
1
1
1
1
1

dfDen
23
23
23
23
23
23

1

23

1

23

F
76.53
0.31
6.80
9.16
1.12
0.34

p
.000
.586
.016
.006
.300
.565

η2g
.73
.00
.01
.02
.00
.00

2.79 14.29

4.49

.045

.00

0.01 18.91

0.02

.897

.00

SSNum
3614.80
0.40
17.08
23.63
1.98
0.66

SSDen
1086.38
30.21
57.80
59.35
40.55
44.59

Note. dfNum indicates degrees of freedom numerator. dfDen indicates degrees of freedom
denominator. SSNum indicates sum of squares numerator. SSDen indicates sum of squares
denominator. η2g indicates generalized eta-squared.

fMRI Results, Whole-brain Univariate Analyses
Conditioning Effects. In order to evaluate the persistence of differential fear
conditioning throughout the experimental phases of the experiment, a whole-brain univariate
analysis compared patterns of activity between “attend” CS+ alone and “attend” CS- alone
conditions (Figure 2.2). Greater elevated activity was observed during the CS+ condition
compared to the CS- condition in the bilateral anterior Insula, ACC, left Caudate, and bilateral
midbrain. Additionally, elevated activity in this contrast was noted in the bilateral central
operculum, extending into the parietal operculum. In the CS- > CS+ contrast, regions of greater
activity during viewing of the CS- than while viewing the CS+ included the bilateral superior
frontal gyrus, dorsomedial precentral gyrus, and left anterior hippocampus.
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Internal Regulation Effects. A second whole-brain analysis was performed to explore
the BOLD activity specific to the External and Internal regulation of the CS+. Individual
contrasts defining the effect of distraction as a difference in differences between BOLD values
while attending to the distractor (CS+ vs CS-) and BOLD values while attending to the face
(CS+ vs CS-) were generated at the first level. A mixed-effects FLAME 1+2 analysis contrasted
this effect of distraction between External and Internal blocks.

Figure 2.6. BOLD activity of regulation of the CS+ by distraction, Int > Ext. A first-level
contrast was created to isolate the effects of distraction on the CS+ face x = ((CSplusDistract –
CSminusDistract) – (CSplusFace – CSminusFace)) across trials and then compared at the group
level by contrasting the External and Internal blocks (Int(x) – Ext(x)). a) BOLD activity in the
dlPFC across conditions. A mask for the dlPFC was generated using the univariate interaction
analysis and applied to all conditions. Activity in the dlPFC was significantly elevated in the
Internal distraction condition. b) DlPFC BOLD activity during distraction tasks only.
Regions of significantly higher activity in the Internal “attend place” > Internal “attend
face” contrast over the External contrast were identified (Figure 2.5). These regions indicate a
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prefrontal network that includes the bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the right anterior
cingulate gyrus, and areas of the left inferior frontal gyrus. These results suggest that this
network shows significantly greater activity during an Internal Distraction task than during an
External Distraction task.
Table 2.9. Internal and External Distraction Effects
#
k
Brain Region
Internal Distraction > External Distraction
1 12699 Middle Frontal Gyrus, Superior and
Inferior Frontal Gyrus, Frontal Pole,
Orbitofrontal Gyrus, Angular Gyrus,
Cingulate Gyrus, Paracingulate Gyrus,
Precentral Gyrus, Middle Temporal
Gyrus, Superior Parietal Cortex,
Supramarginal Gyrus
External Distraction > Internal Distraction
n.s.

H

Z

x

MNI
y

R/L

4.86

12

42

z
18

# = the number of a cluster, ordered by size; k = the number of contiguous voxels in the cluster;
Brain region = regions of local maxima included in the broader cluster. The region names are
taken generally from the Harvard Oxford atlas in FSL; H = principal hemisphere of the cluster,
right (R) or left (L); Z = maximum z-value from the cluster within the given brain region;
MNI(X,Y,Z) = coordinates of the voxel with the maximum effect in the standardized space of
the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI), represented in units of millimeters (mm).

fMRI Results, PPA/Insula Correlation Analysis
Calculating differences in BOLD activity between attend face and attend distractor
conditions generated a “distraction effect” value for each ROI. Correlational analysis between
distraction effect in the PPA and Insula yielded a bilateral correlation between distraction effect
in the PPA and distraction effect in the insula in the Internal condition [r(24) = 0.43, p = .037].
This relationship was not significant in the external condition.
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DISCUSSION
Across both behavioral and fMRI data, results from this study indicated that both objectbased and mental imagery-based distractors effectively down-regulated differentially conditioned
fear. The internal distraction task was similarly effective to the external task for reducing the
effects of a conditioned fear stimulus. These findings are broadly consistent with the biasedcompetition model regarding attention and emotion regulation (Bishop, 2008; Blair & Mitchell,
2009). The internal distractor also resulted in significantly elevated activity in regions associated
with emotional and cognitive processing (anterior insular cortex and prefrontal cortex
respectively). This pattern of activity suggests that while the Internal distractor is as effective as
the External distractor in regulating fear, it requires considerably more cognitive resources to
deploy than distraction via a visual object-based stimulus.
Our initial hypothesis posited that directing attention to a distractor would result in a
reduction in both reported fear response and a corresponding decrease in BOLD activity in the
anterior Insula compared to attending to the CS+. Our prior behavioral study (Study 1) supported
the theory that fear responses decreased during both distraction tasks, as measured by self-report
ratings. Behaviorally, that pattern was supported by the results of this study. Results from the
SCR measures showed that the conditioning effect in CS+ vs CS- image alone trials was
significant, but this difference was not distinguishable in the composite image trials. This lack of
SCR modulation despite downregulation in subjective reports has been noted in previous
research using cognitive regulation tasks (Wiemer, Rauner, Stegmann, & Pauli, 2021). Results
from the behavioral Likert reports supported the assertion that fear was successfully conditioned
in the participant sample, and that both Internal and External distraction tasks reduced fear
ratings.
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Of particular interest to this study was how these findings were reflected in the fMRI
results and whether the theorized mechanism of this effect can be supported by evidence from
other regions. Elevated activity from the right anterior insula can be considered indicative of the
successfully conditioned emotional response. BOLD activity in attend face conditions matched
the conditioned response seen in Likert reports. In both Internal and External distract conditions,
insular response did not differentiate between CS+ and CS-. This lack of differentiation can be
taken as support for the hypothesis that both forms of distraction effectively moderated the
conditioning effect. However, BOLD activity in the anterior insula was significantly elevated in
the internal distraction condition, even above that recorded during the CS+ alone condition. It
seems likely that there is an additional effect on BOLD activity in the insula during the internal
distraction task that is elevating activity independent of the controlled conditioning or distraction
effects initially predicted by the study. This does not contradict the support for our hypothesis, as
in both conditions, the effect of conditioning was diminished. However, it encourages further
investigation into how the mechanisms behind generating mental imagery could produce these
effects.
To confirm that participants were performing the imagine-place distractor task, the left
and right PPA were identified and masked using BOLD data from the initial habituation scans.
Analysis of the PPA revealed elevated activity during attend-place trials in both External and
Internal composite conditions. From this, we can infer that the participants were imagining the
distractors during the Internal task. While this supports the PPA’s involvement in our noted
down-regulatory effects, it does not explain the elevated aIn activity noted during the Internal
Distraction task. Earlier analyses identified patterns of activation supporting the presence of fear
conditioning, but did not draw a direct comparison between internal and external distraction

57

effects at the whole brain level. Comparison between External and Internal Distraction effects
produced a whole-brain analysis indicating differential activity between block types unique to
the internal distraction task. Elevated BOLD activity in the dorsolateral and medial prefrontal
cortex suggests a higher degree of cognitive processing involved in the internal distraction task.
This indicates that the internal distraction task required a greater degree of cognitive resources to
produce the same fear reduction effect, offering a potential explanation for the elevated activity
noted in the aIn.
That mental imagery-based distraction requires significantly greater cognitive effort
raises several questions when comparing our findings to the broader literature on distraction in
emotion regulation. Mental imagery-based distraction tasks are not uncommon in regulation
paradigms, but little direct comparison exists between object-based and mental imagery-based
distractors. This discrepancy was one of the motivations for this study. Given our findings that
mental imagery-based distraction was significantly more effortful than object-based distraction,
we must consider what this implied for other forms of emotion regulation with mental imagerybased components. An internal distractor task may be effective due to the introduction of new
cognitive demand, in addition to the established effects of attentional control. Whether this
affects the practical applicability of mental imagery-based distractors as a regulatory technique
remains to be seen. Both approaches were equally effective in this study, but existing paradigms
may want to consider their stimuli and how their results may be interpreted in this context.
Regarding other emotion regulation techniques, cognitive reappraisal may benefit from
closer inspection. Reappraisal models assert that the effectiveness of reappraisal as a regulatory
technique is based on its manipulation of the meaning of the target stimulus without redirecting
attention from the stimulus itself (McRae et al., 2012). Reappraisal is typically contrasted with
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distraction, a technique in which regulatory effects are assumed to be based on intercepting
direct engagement with the stimulus. Our results raise two possibilities: first, that this may not be
the only mechanism by which a nominally distraction-based task may be effective, and second,
that an internally generated distraction task can activate regions of cognitive processing that
notably overlap with those found in cognitive reappraisal (Etkin et al., 2015). It seems prudent to
address the possibility that some reappraisal paradigms may be relying on the same mechanisms
as internal distraction, rather than representing a separate technique.
Cumulatively, our findings support mental imagery-based distraction as an effective
technique for regulating conditioned fear, but indicate significant differences in how it is
represented in the brain. The engagement of the PPA during both internal and external tasks
indicates that both tasks share common mechanisms in visual imagery processing. However, the
noted prefrontal activity, as well as the elevated aIn response during the internal distraction,
suggest that the two approaches should not be considered equivalent. We feel that this calls for
additional scrutiny on the design of distraction paradigms, and further investigation into the
relationships between internal distraction and other forms of emotion regulation.
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CHAPTER 3. ASSOCIATIVE STRENGTH AND SUBJECTIVE
EXPECTANCY
Fear is associated both with the conscious experience of feeling afraid and autonomic
reactions, such as the skin conductance response (SCR) or heart rate, related to defensive
behavior (Beckers, Krypotos, Boddez, Effting, & Kindt, 2013; Lang, Davis, & Öhman, 2000).
While some research indicates that these aspects of fear are related (Jiang et al., 2021; Kron,
Goldstein, Lee, Gardhouse, & Anderson, 2013), other research indicates that the conscious
experience of fear is dissociable from the autonomic response to fearful stimuli (Lang et al.,
2000; LeDoux & Pine, 2016).
Pavlovian conditioning is a prevalent procedure used to study fear in humans. This
paradigm consists of repeated pairing of an initially neutral conditioned stimulus (CS+) with an
aversive unconditioned stimulus (US; e.g., a mild shock). As a result, the presentation of the CS+
alone elicits a conditioned response (CR; e.g., self-reported fear or elevated SCR). Despite its
apparent simplicity and extensive study (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Mertens & Engelhard, 2020;
Sehlmeyer et al., 2009), the cognitive and neural processes underlying fear conditioning, and
Pavlovian conditioning more generally, are still the topic of much debate (Mertens & Engelhard,
2020; C. J. Mitchell et al., 2009).
One common interpretation is that CRs emerge as a function of the associative strength
between a CS and an US (Perruchet, 2015; Rescorla & Solomon, 1967), encoded in the
amygdala independent of declarative knowledge of the association (Bechara et al., 1995; Clark,
1998). This associative strength model posits that the magnitude of the CR changes as a function
of the CS–US association history. For example, as the number of sequential CS+US (i.e., trials in
which the CS and US are both presented) trials increases, the strength of the association
increases, and conversely, the strength of the association decreases as the number of sequential
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CS trials without the US (i.e., CS-alone) increases. Previous research in both humans and nonhuman primates indicates that the amygdala reflects the associative strength between the CS and
US (Belova, Paton, & Salzman, 2008; Li, Schiller, Schoenbaum, Phelps, & Daw, 2011), as do
sensory regions associated with the CS (Greening, Lee, & Mather, 2016; Miskovic & Keil, 2012;
Moratti & Keil, 2009; Weinberger, 2004).

Figure 3.1. Visualization of the predicted self-reported CR probability by length of preceding
trial sequence for the Expectancy versus Associative Strength model.
The expectancy model offers an alternative perspective predicting that human fear
conditioning is the result of a conscious expectation of the US following the presentation of the
CS. According to this model, propositional knowledge of the association is required for the
generation of a CR (Boddez et al., 2020; C. J. Mitchell et al., 2009). One example is the so-called
gambler’s fallacy, in which sequential unreinforced CS+ trials increase participants’ expectation
of shock despite a fixed reinforcement rate of 50% (Burns & Corpus, 2004). Another example is
instructed fear conditioning in which being told the CS–US relationship is sufficient to generate
greater activity in the bilateral anterior insula (aIn) and dorsal anterior cingulate (dACC) but not
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the amygdala for the CS+ versus CS- in differential conditioning (Mechias et al., 2010). This
potentially reflects the role of the aIn and dmPFC in the conscious experience of fear and anxiety
(Harrison et al., 2015; Uddin, Nomi, Hébert-Seropian, Ghaziri, & Boucher, 2017). Additionally,
human (Kroes et al., 2019) and non-human animal (Shi & Davis, 1999) research suggests these
regions are involved in the expression, though not the acquisition, of CRs.
In order to dissociate the predictions of the expectancy model from those of the
associative strength model, the present study adopted a single-cue conditioning paradigm (Figure
3.1) combined with a pseudo-randomized trial sequence and a partial reinforcement schedule of
50% (Perruchet, 1985). The experiment comprised sequential CS+US or CS-alone trials of
various lengths. This study is the first functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study to
test the hypothesis that while activity supporting associative strength model would manifest in
the amygdala and sensory cortices, support for expectancy model would be observed in the aIn
and dACC. The identification of dissociable networks contributing to each model would be
consistent with contemporary two-system models of fear conditioning (LeDoux & Pine, 2016).

METHODS
Participants
Twenty-three participants were recruited from the Louisiana State University community.
All were English speakers and reported normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. No
participant had neurological or psychiatric antecedents, and none were taking medication known
to affect the central nervous system. One participant was excluded because of a technical issue.
Data from one additional participant were discarded due to excessive head movements during the
fMRI session. The final sample included 21 participants (11 females, mean age = 24.24 years,
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SD = 5.90). This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the Louisiana State
University. All participants provided written informed consent prior to testing, being fully aware
of the nature of the stimuli to be presented. Subjects received a financial compensation of $45 for
their participation.
Apparatus
The experimental paradigm was delivered using Matlab R2016b (Version 9.1;
MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA) with the Psychtoolbox extension. Shock stimuli were
administered using the STMISOC and STM100C modules of BIOPAC Systems and delivered by
means of two MRI-safe electrodes places on the distal phalanges of the fourth and fifth digits of
the non-dominant hand. Participants reported by way of a two-response button box held in their
dominant hand.
Stimuli
The single face stimulus used in this study as the CS was a standardized 400x400px
greyscale face image from the Cohn-Kanade emotional faces database. The image depicts a
white male with neutral emotional affect. The image was cropped to show only the face from
hairline to chin against a flat grey background. The US consisted of a mild 50-ms pulsed electric
shock at 50Hz (10 pulses with a duration of 5-ms each). Shock intensity was calibrated
independently for each participant (see below for details). Face (15 male, 15 female) and place
(15 house, 15 building) images used in the functional localizer task following the experimental
sessions were drawn from the same standardized image database. All were emotionally neutral
400x400 images in greyscale against flat grey backgrounds. The CS used in the experimental
sessions was not included in the localizer set.
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Design
The experimental design was based on the one used by Perruchet (1985) and Moratti and
Keil (2009). The main task consisted of three runs (i.e., functional runs in the scanner) of 45
trials per run for a total of 135 trials across all three runs. Half the trials were CS-alone trials in
which the US was omitted.

Figure 3.2. Sample trial structure (a) and a visualization of potential CS+US and CS-alone trial
sequences. Note, in the trial sequences participants we view the whole trial as exemplified above
(b). Conditions are labeled and analyzed relative to the preceding trial sequence, including
subsequences within longer sets. Peaks in (c) depict hypothetical modeling of BOLD signal by
trial in order to separate sequence types, i.e., the trial following two CS+US images is labeled
“double CS+US.”
In the other half of the trials (CS-US pairs), the CS co-terminated with the US. In each run, the
64

45 trials were presented as sequences of one-in-a-row (single), two-in-a-row (double), or threein-a-row (triple) CS+US trials and as sequences of one-in-a-row (single), two-in-a-row (double),
or three-in-a-row (triple) CS-alone trials (Figure 3.2b). The sequences were designed to conform
to a binomial distribution of two equally probable events (CS-alone trials and CS+US trials). In a
given run, the various sequences were randomly shuffled, following a method adopted from
Nicks (1959). Additionally, a CS-alone trial was added at the end of each run to measure
expectancy ratings and brain activity related to the last sequence of the run.
Procedure
A graphical representation of the experimental procedure can be found in Figure 3.2a.
Each trial began by presenting the Likert response task for 3.5s, followed by a variable ISI of 2s
to 3.5s with a fixation dot before presenting the CS image for 10s. Each trial was followed by a
variable ITI of 8.5s to 10s with fixation.
Before starting the main task, participants performed eight practice trials. They were
instructed to pay attention to the face presented in each trial and to rate their expectancy for
shock occurrence during the inter-trial interval. An explanation of the use of the rating device
was provided prior to the practice session. Participants used a two-response button box to report
their expectancy ratings. When they pressed on the left button, a marker on the screen moved
toward the left side of a horizontal scale, and an opposite effect was obtained by pressing on the
right button. The rating scale on the screen was divided into seven levels, from “1 = not at all” to
“7 = very much so”. When the scale appeared on the screen, the cursor was always pointed at
“4”, which meant that the subjective likelihood of receiving a shock on the next trial was 50
percent. The scale remained on the screen for 3.5 seconds (preliminary tests showed this time
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was sufficient to properly perform the expectancy rating task). Participants were informed that
no shock was delivered in the practice and the purpose was to become familiar with the task.
After the practice, electrodes for electrical stimulations were secured and the shock level
was adjusted individually to be “unpleasant but not painful” (Mintensity = 5.91 mA, SD = 3.64,
range: 1.60-20.00 mA; (Grégoire & Greening, 2019, 2020; Murty, LaBar, & Adcock, 2012).
Instructions included the information that the presentation of the face was randomly followed by
an electrical stimulation on 50 percent of the trials. Timing was consistent between the practice
and experimental sessions. Experimental sessions consisted of 45 trials, the final trial in each
session being a dummy presentation to allow time for Likert reporting of the previous
presentation.
To independently localize face processing in the amygdala, a single functional localizer
run was conducted. Standardized sets of 20 neutral face and 20 place images were drawn from
the same Kohn-Kanade database as the experimental face stimulus. Images were divided into
category-specific blocks made up of rapid event-related trial sequences. Each trial sequence
involved the presentation of an image for 0.75s with a 0.25s ISI. Each block was presented five
times in alternating order with a 15s ITI between face and place blocks.
FMRI Acquisition and Analysis
MRI Acquisition
BOLD data for the fMRI analysis were acquired using a 3T GE Discovery MR750w
research scanner with 36-channel head coil at Pennington Biomedical Research Center.
Anatomical imaging acquired prior to functional trials used a 256x256 T1-weighted protocol
with 1mm slice thickness at 1.0 x 1.0 in-plane voxel resolution at a 10° flip angle for 176 slices.
Functional imaging was performed using a single-shot gradient echo EPI sequence (TR =
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2000ms, TE = 20ms, FOV = 22.4cm, flip angle = 90°, bandwidth = 7812.5 Hz/px, echo spacing
= .578ms for 38 slices) with an in-plane voxel resolution of 3.0mm x 3.0mm and 3mm slice
thickness in interleaved ascending order. Functional trials were 582 volumes in length, while the
functional localizer comprised 179 volumes. An initial three-volume set of dummy volumes
from each run were excluded from the analysis.
Preprocessing and Whole-brain Univariate Analysis
Analysis of acquired BOLD data was conducted within the FSL software package using
the fMRI Expert Analysis Tool (FEAT) version 6.00. Anatomical data were first skull-stripped
to isolate the brain from surrounding tissue using FSL’s BET module, while functional data
underwent motion correction using FSL’s motion outliers function to identify and model out
framewise displacement greater than 0.9mm. Functional data was then motion corrected using
MCFLIRT, slice-time corrected using Fourier-space time-series phase-shifting, smoothed with a
Gaussian kernel of FWHM 7mm, and ran through a 100s high-pass temporal filtering (Gaussianweighted least-squares straight line fitting).
The data were analyzed within the General Linear Model using a multi-level mixedeffects design. The first-level analysis was carried out at the single-subject level and each run
was modelled separately. In the first-level analysis trial-by-trial data were model with 6
regressors of interest corresponding to each our primary experimental conditions: single, double
or triple CS+US trials, and single, double, or triple CS-alone trials. Importantly, the modeling of
a given trial was based on what type of trial sequence had immediately proceed it (Figure 3.2c).
For example, following two CS+US trials, the subsequent trial would be modelled as a double
CS+US trial regardless of whether or not it was a CS+US or CS-alone trial itself. Additionally,
in a triple CS+US sequence, the second trial in the sequence would be modelled as a single

67

CS+US trial and the third trial in the sequence would be modelled as a double CS+US trial in the
GLM, in reference to the preceding CS+US trials. These contrasts were convolved using a
double-gamma hemodynamic response function (HRF) to generate first level condition files
from each run that modeled both the conditions of interest and nuisance regressors for motion
and the shock stimulus. We included two important nuisance regressors to address the possibility
that the US was a potential confound, one for the US delivery (i.e., to model out the impact of
the physical shock) and one for US expectancy on non-shock trials (i.e., the same time period
when shock would have occurred in a shock trial) to account for any confounding anticipatory
US reactivity (Dunsmoor, Bandettini, & Knight, 2008; Wood, Kuykendall, Ver Hoef, & Knight,
2014). We also included regressors of no-interests relating to motion, including the 6 standard
and 18 extended motion correction parameters, and motion censoring regressors from the
framewise displacement evaluation at preprocessing. Each of the regressors of interest and the
regressors relating to the US delivery and US expectancy were convolved using a double-gamma
hemodynamic response function (HRF) including a model for the temporal derivative of each.
Importantly, two first-level weighted contrasts were also created to weight trials based on the
expectancy versus the associative strength models, respectively. To evaluate the regions
associated with the expectancy model we assigned the highest weight (5) to triple CS-alone trials
and the lowest weight (-5) to triple CS+US trials. The other weights were as follows: double CSalone (3), double CS+US (-3), single CS-alone (1), and single CS+US (-1). Weighting conditions
by +/- two was done to evaluate the presence of a linear effect by ensuring that the weighted
difference was equal between adjacent trial types in the contrast model (i.e., a between
conditions contrast of [-5 -3 -1 1 3 5]). Inverse weighting was applied to create a second linear
weighted analysis that would evaluate the associative strength model, with positive weight
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assigned to CS+US trials and negative weights assigned to CS-alone trials. First-level contrasts
were then combined in second-level analyses at the single-subject level via fixed-effects analysis
and transformed into MNI space. Finally, group-level analysis was performed using FLAME
1+2 mixed effects modeling. We applied a threshold of Z > 2.3 and a (corrected) cluster size
probability of p = 0.05 (Worsley, 2001). A second set of univariate analyses contrasted BOLD
activity during CS+US versus CS-alone sequences. Level 1 contrasts were generated for triple
CS+US vs triple CS-alone, double CS+US vs double CS-alone, and single CS+US vs single CSalone trials using the same parameters as the trend analyses. These three contrasts were also
combined in second level analyses using fixed-effects analysis and analyzed at the group level
using FLAME1+2 mixed effects modeling. As in the previous analysis, group level maps were
thresholded to Z > 2.3 with a (corrected) cluster size probability of p = 0.05.
Functional Localizer
Preprocessing of the functional localizer applied the same parameters as used for the
experimental sessions. Face and place blocks were modeled in FSL as separate contrasts at the
first level before transformation to standard space at the second level. As this was a functional
localizer to be used to define a group-specific functional region of interest (ROI) we performed a
Fixed-effects group-level analysis of Face versus Place activity. A cluster defining the right
amygdala was identified and used to generate a group-level functionally defined ROI. As the
amygdala was an a priori region of interest with respect to the associative strength model, this
was masked and the mask used to perform a small volume correction on the experimental data
during a group level FLAME1+2 mixed effects analysis by limiting the search space to voxels
responding to the experimental manipulation to those within the functional localizer-defined
region.
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RESULTS
Expectancy ratings
A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) on expectancy ratings performed
with trial sequence (6 levels) as a within-subject variable revealed a significant main effect of
trial sequence [F(5, 100) = 57.98, p < 0.001, 𝜂𝑝2 = 0.744]. A significant linear trend was also
identified, indicating that expectancy rantings decreased linearly with sequential shock [F(1, 20)
= 71.88, p < 0.001, 𝜂𝑝2 = 0.782] (Figure 3.3).

Figure 3.3. Self-reported expectancy ratings by preceding trial sequence. Error bars represent
standard error of the mean.
fMRI Univariate Results
(The unthresholded whole-brain maps used in these analyses can be found at
https://neurovault.org/collections/WMDOLFVB/).
Associative Strength model
Patterns of BOLD activation from the mixed-effects Flame 1+2 analyses show a network
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of regions responding to associative strength (Figure 3.4, Blue; Table 1). The contrast derived
from the associative strength trend revealed significant activity in a network that includes the
right lateral occipital cortex, right angular gyrus, as well as anterior-dorsal regions of the
prefrontal cortex including bilateral superior and middle frontal gyri, and frontal pole. The ROI
analysis using the functional localizer-derived amygdala mask revealed a significant cluster in
the right amygdala consistent with the associative strength model (Figure 3.5).

Figure 3.4. BOLD activity identified in the whole-brain corrected expectancy (orange) and
associative strength (blue) trend analyses. Activity indicates results from CS-alone > CS+US
(Expectancy) and CS+US > CA-alone (Associative Strength) weighted linear contrasts.
Expectancy model
The expectancy trend analysis shows a second network of regions responding consistent
with the expectancy model (Figure 3.4, Orange; Table 1). Longer sets of sequential CS-alone
trials were followed by elevated activity in the bilateral aIn (Figure 3.5). Also identified were

71

regions of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex that included the superior frontal gyrus, and the
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex.
Contrasts of CS-alone and CS+US
To further clarify the neural regions associated with sequences of CS-alone versus the
CS+US an additional set of exploratory univariate whole-brain analyses were conducted.
CS+US > CS-alone. The single CS+US > single CS-alone contrast showed a wide
network of elevated activity in the bilateral amygdala, hippocampus, medial prefrontal cortex,
and frontal pole, as well as distributed regions in the intracalcarine, lateral occipital, and middle
temporal cortices, and lingual gyrus, and posterior insula. (Figure 3.6, yellow).
The double CS+US > double CS-alone contrast showed a cluster of activity in the middle
temporal and lateral occipital cortices (Figure 3.6, blue). The triple CS+US > triple CS-alone
identified a dorsomedial prefrontal cluster extending into the superior frontal gyrus and frontal
pole (Figure 3.6, green) similar to regions found in the single sequence contrast.
CS-alone > CS+US. Single CS-alone > single CS+US conditions showed no clusters of
significantly elevated activity. In the double CS-alone > double CS+US trials we observed
elevated activation in the intracalcarine cortex, lingual gyrus, and occipital pole (Figure 3.7,
Blue).
In the triple CS-alone > triple CS+US contrast, significantly elevated activity was found
in a number of regions, including the bilateral anterior insula (Figure 3.7, Green). This suggests
higher activity in regions associated with subjective threat appraisal following CS-alone trials
than was present following CS+US trials. Significant activity was also noted in the inferior and
superior frontal gyrus, left hippocampus, and cingulate gyrus. Similar to the double trial contrast,
the intracalcarine cortex, lingual gyrus, and thalamus were significantly active.
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Figure 3.5. Graphical visualization of BOLD activity in notable regions from the trend analyses.
Displayed regions were derived from expectancy (left anterior insula (a), right anterior insula (b),
right dACC/mPFC (c)) and associative strength (right amygdala (d), right lateral occipital cortex
(e), and superior-medial frontal cluster (f)) analyses respectively. For display purposes only, the
left (a) and right (b) insula clusters are the result of thresholding the whole brain image at Z > 3.0
and masking with the Harvard-Oxford Cortical Structural Atlas insula masks to isolate insularelated activity from a much larger cluster spanning several distinct brain regions. Error bars
represent standard error of the mean.
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Figure 3.6. BOLD activity identified in whole-brain corrected CS+US > CS-alone contrasts.
Yellow clusters represent single CS+US > single CS-alone results. Blue clusters represent double
CS+US > double CS-alone results. Green clusters represent triple CS+US > triple CS-alone
results.

Figure 3.7. BOLD activity identified whole-brain corrected CS-alone > CS+US contrasts. Blue
clusters represent double CS-alone > double CS+US results. Green clusters represent triple CSalone > triple CS+US results.
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Table 3.1. Associative Strength and Expectancy network BOLD clusters
#
k
Brain Region
Associative Strength Trend
1 2548 Inferior & Superior Lateral Occipital
Cortex, Angular Gyrus, Middle
Temporal Gyrus
2 1914 Frontal Pole, Middle & Superior Frontal
Gyrus, Paracingulate Gyrus (L)
3 1335 Frontal Pole
Expectancy Trend
1 16947 Insula, Operculum, Inferior Frontal
Gyrus, Precentral Gyrus, Intracalcarine
Cortex, Lingual Gyrus, Occipital Pole,
Putamen, Thalamus, Brain Stem
2 2712 Anterior Cingulate Gyrus,
Supplementary Motor Cortex,
Postcentral Gyrus (R), Precentral Gyrus
(R), Superior Frontal Gyrus (R)
3 1386 Supramarginal Gyrus

H

Z

x

MNI
y

R

4.44

54

-78

6

R/L

3.8

-8

42

50

R/L

3.59

10

68

20

R/L

4.59

2

-92

-20

R/L

4.04

28

0

72

L

4.34

-68

-30

30

z

# = the number of a cluster, ordered by size; k = the number of contiguous voxels in the cluster;
Brain region = regions of local maxima included in the broader cluster. The region names are
taken generally from the Harvard Oxford atlas in FSL; H = principal hemisphere of the cluster,
right (R) or left (L); Z = maximum z-value from the cluster within the given brain region;
MNI(X,Y,Z) = coordinates of the voxel with the maximum effect in the standardized space of
the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI), represented in units of millimeters (mm).
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Table 3.2. CS-alone > US+US and CS+US> CS-alone BOLD clusters
MNI
y

#
k
Brain Region
H
Z
x
z
Single CS+US > Single CS Alone
1 48314 Amygdala, Middle & Superior Frontal
R/L 4.4
10 62 20
Gyrus, Frontal Pole, Posterior Insula,
Operculum, Intracalcarine Cortex, Lingual
Gyrus, Posterior Cingulate Gyrus,
Paracingulate Gyrus, Cuneal Cortex,
Hippocampus, Inferior & Superior Lateral
Occipital Cortex, Occipital Pole, Angular
Gyrus, Superior & Middle Temporal Gyrus,
Precentral Gyrus, Postcentral Gyrus,
Putamen, Thalamus, Brain Stem
Double CS+US > Double CS Alone
1 1437 Inferior & Middle Temporal Gyrus, Inferior
R
3.57 70 -56 -6
& Superior Lateral Occipital Cortex
Triple CS+US > Triple CS Alone
1 1410 Frontal Pole, Superior frontal Gyrus, Middle R/L 3.51 -16 58 26
Frontal Gyrus (R), Paracingulate Gyrus (L)
Single CS Alone > Single CS+US
n.s.
Double CS Alone > Double CS+US
1 5047 Intracalcarine Cortex, Lingual Gyrus,
R/L 4.01
2 -90 -18
Occipital Pole, Thalamus, Brain Stem
Triple CS Alone > Triple CS+US
1 15846 Anterior Insula, Operculum, Inferior Frontal R/L 4.28 -58 10 8
Gyrus, Precentral Gyrus, Intracalcarine
Cortex, Lingual Gyrus, Occipital Fusiform
Gyrus, Hippocampus (L), Posterior
Cingulate Cortex, Putamen, Thalamus, Brain
Stem
2 2372 Superior Frontal Gyrus, Superior Parietal
R
3.79 18 -8 82
Cortex, Precentral Gyrus, Postcentral Gyrus,
Posterior Cingulate Gyrus
3 1551 Operculum, Postcentral Gyrus, Anterior &
L
4.22 -66 -30 30
Posterior Supramarginal Gyrus
4 1178 Anterior Cingulate Gyrus, Paracingulate
R/L 3.77
6
6 46
Gyrus, Precentral Gyrus (R)
# = the number of a cluster, ordered by size; k = the number of contiguous voxels in the cluster;
Brain region = regions of local maxima included in the broader cluster. The region names are
taken generally from the Harvard Oxford atlas in FSL; H = principal hemisphere of the cluster,
right (R) or left (L); Z = maximum z-value from the cluster within the given brain region;
MNI(X,Y,Z) = coordinates of the voxel with the maximum effect in the standardized space of
the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI), represented in units of millimeters (mm).
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DISCUSSION
This study tested the prediction that there are dissociable brain networks reflecting the
associative strength model and the expectancy model of Pavlovian fear conditioning, consistent
with two-systems theories of threat and fear reactivity. We observed that trial-by-trial selfreported expectancy trended negatively with repeated CS+US pairings consistent with the
expectancy model prediction. Neurologically, we observed a significant linear effect in the right
amygdala and lateral occipital cortex as the number of sequential CS+US trials increased
consistent with the associative strength model, and a significant linear increase in aIn and dACC
activity as the number of sequential CS-alone trials increased consistent with the expectancy
model. More broadly, we found two dissociable networks, one related to the associative strength
model and the other to the expectancy model. Our findings are consistent with a two-systems
model of fear processing, though regions implicated in each of the systems differ somewhat from
those proposed by LeDoux and Pine (2016).
Self-reported expectancy ratings in this study were consistent with the expectancy model.
We observed a significant linear effect such that participants’ expectation of receiving shock
increased with the number of sequential CS-alone trials and decreased with the number of
sequential CS+US trials. This is consistent with previous research using similar paradigms
(Moratti and Keil, 2009; Perruchet, 1985), as well as the gambler’s fallacy (Burns and Corpus,
2004). Our findings were distinct from several studies using the Perruchet paradigm (Perruchet,
2015) which have reported that CRs parallel associative strength when measuring somatic
(Weidemann, Broderick, Lovibond, & Mitchell, 2012) and autonomic (Perruchet et al., 2016)
CRs, as well as in cued reaction time tasks (Perruchet, Cleeremans, & Destrebecqz, 2006).
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The linear fMRI contrast revealed several regions significantly associated with the
associative strength model. First, the whole-brain analysis revealed elevated activity in the right
lateral occipital cortex and bilateral superior and middle frontal gyri. Involvement of the lateral
occipital cortex is consistent with face stimuli activating the right occipital face area (GrillSpector, Kourtzi, & Kanwisher, 2001), as well as evidence that sensory cortices associated with
the CS increase in activity following associative learning (Greening et al., 2016; Miskovic &
Keil, 2012; Moratti & Keil, 2009; Weinberger, 2004). While activity in the middle and superior
frontal gyrus was not predicted, the bilateral activity observed in these regions extends
posteriorly into the premotor cortex and frontal eye fields (Kastner et al., 2007). These regions
are consistent with previous behavioral research in humans demonstrating that reaction times and
eyeblinks mirror the associative strength model (Perruchet 2015), as well as research with nonhuman primates demonstrating that reward-related associative learning affects activity in dorsal
fronto-parietal areas associated with eye movements (Schultz & Dickinson, 2000). Our small
volume analysis of the amygdala also revealed a significant linear relationship consistent with
the associative strength model. This is in keeping with research suggesting that the amygdala
adapts on a trial-by-trial basis to the strength of the association between the CS and US (Belova
et al., 2008; Li et al., 2011). The separate contrast of the single sequences only (CS+US > CSalone) demonstrated that the bilateral amygdala was robustly active following the first CS+US
pairing (Figure 3.5). Together, the results of the present study are consistent with the amygdala’s
role in the rapid detection of fear-relevant stimuli, the prioritization of attention, and the priming
of defensive behaviors (Holland & Gallagher, 1999; LeDoux & Pine, 2016; Roesch, Calu, Esber,
& Schoenbaum, 2010).

78

Regarding the early visual cortex, we observed medial visual regions associated with
expectancy. This is distinct from Moratti and Keil (2009) in which visual cortex activity
appeared to reflect the associative strength theory. Two potential factors may have contributed to
this difference. First, the properties of the stimulus chosen as the CS may have influenced where
the impact of associative strength occurred. Moratti and Keil (2009) used a basic visual grating
(i.e., a 45-degree contrast grating) as their CS. This low-level stimulus-type is primarily
processed in the primary visual cortex, which has been shown to respond to a low-level visual
stimulus undergoing fear conditioning (McTeague, Gruss, & Keil, 2015; Padmala & Pessoa,
2008). Conversely, we used a human face image. Faces are preferentially processed in a more
holistic manner later in the ventral visual stream, primarily in the right lateral occipital cortex
and right fusiform cortex (Grill-Spector et al., 2001). Consistent with this, in the present study
we observed that the right lateral occipital cortex responded according to the associative strength
theory, increasing in activity as the number of sequential CS+US trials increased. Secondly, our
stimulus is distinct from Moratti and Keil (2009) in terms of biological relevance to fear or threat
(i.e., fear-relevant stimuli). Fear-relevant stimuli such as faces (or snakes and spiders) have been
found to fear condition more readily and extinguish more slowly compared either fear-irrelevant
stimuli such as flowers, mushrooms, or artifactual images (Atlas & Phelps, 2018; Mineka &
Öhman, 2002). However, findings regarding the relationship between fear-relevant stimuli and
rates of conditioning and extinction are mixed (Åhs et al., 2018).
We observed a wide network of regions displaying a linear relationship consistent with
the expectancy model. Most notably, activity in the bilateral aIn and bilateral dACC, as well as
aspects of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), trended positively with expectancy. Both
regions have been observed in studies of instructed fear conditioning in which the CS+ is never

79

physical paired with the US (Mechias et al., 2010), suggesting that both regions contribute to the
conscious expectation of an aversive US. However, Mechias et al. (2010) and a more recent
meta-analysis (M. A. Fullana et al., 2016; Miquel A. Fullana et al., 2018) of fear conditioning
have observed aIn and dACC involvement in differential fear conditioning. Most studies
included in these meta-analyses used partial reinforcement schedules in which the potential
contributions of expectancy versus associative strength are not isolated from one another.
Nevertheless, partial reinforcement schedules generally elevate uncertainty regarding when the
US will occur, which has been associated with aIn and dACC/dmPFC activity (Morriss, Gell, &
van Reekum, 2019). Similarly, anxious anticipation of potential threat in fear conditioning is also
associated with increased activity in the aIn and dACC/dmPFC (Harrison et al., 2015). Another
potential explanation is that this network reflects interoceptive awareness of ones fear state as a
component of subjective appraisal (Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Öhman, & Dolan, 2004).
Consistent with the role of aIn in interception, we observed significant activity in aspects of the
brainstem and diencephalon potentially associated with autonomic arousal. Additionally, brain
lesion research involving fear conditioning has found that the aIn and dACC/dmPFC are not
required for the acquisition of fear conditioning, though they are necessary for the expression
(Shi & Davis, 1999) or conscious modulation of fear (Kroes et al., 2019). More generally, aIn
lesions have been associated with alexithymia in humans, a condition in which one has difficulty
subjectively experiencing emotional state (Hogeveen, Bird, Chau, Krueger, & Grafman, 2016).
Together, our results and the previous findings are consistent with aIn and dACC participation in
a network involved in conscious appraisal of threat.
Rather than supporting either associative strength or expectancy models, our results are
most consistent with two-systems models of fear such as that proposed by LeDoux and Pine
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(2016). LeDoux and Pine differentiate changes induced by associative learning from those
related to the conscious state of fear and anxiety. This two-system view poses that both systems
can be active simultaneously but targeted separately for analysis or intervention. The associative
strength network we identified is conceptually similar to the proposed “defensive responding”
circuit, while our expectancy network can be considered a component of “feeling states” relevant
to fear. Although distinct, it remains unlikely that these networks operate in isolation. The
anterior insula’s involvement in associative learning under uncertainty noted by Morriss et al.
(2019) was accompanied by elevated activity in the amygdala. Moreover, research in the
emotion regulation literature has found evidence that the insula can exert a down-regulatory
influence on the amygdala (Nicholson et al., 2017). Together, these studies indicate the
possibility of integration between the amygdala and insula during appraisal.
Cumulatively, the results from this study support the presence of two dissociable
networks reflecting the associative strength between a CS and a US versus the expectancy of
receiving a US given the presence of a CS. This begins to reconcile some of the competing
findings in the literature, though it also points to the need for future research to better understand
the contributions of associative strength versus expectancy in behavioral, physiological, and
subjective aspects of fear. For example, future research could evaluate whether the presence of a
safe conditioned stimulus (i.e., CS-) and use of differential conditioning affects associative
strength, as single cue conditioning may be more automatically acquired (Carter, Hofstotter,
Tsuchiya, & Koch, 2003). Moreover, future research is required to determine under which
conditions the networks identified in this study compete or cooperate, as it not possible to
determine with the current paradigm. While self-report findings in the present study reflected the
expectancy theory, future research could benefit from the inclusion of behavioral or peripheral
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physiological measures, which should reflect the associative strength model (Perruchet et al.,
2006, 2016).
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The primary objective of this investigation was to assess the effectiveness of mental
imagery in regulating differentially conditioned fear. We hypothesized that using mental imagery
to distract oneself from the conditioned stimulus would downregulate fear response. Results
from Study 1 demonstrated that mental imagery functioned as an effective target for distraction,
with similar effectiveness to an object-based distracter in terms of self-reported fear. These
findings were further supported by study 2, in which both self-report and BOLD activity in the
anterior insula were reduced while attending to either the mental imagery-based distracter or the
object-based distracter, again with comparable effectiveness. Our results were consistent with the
biased-competition model’s prediction that top-down attentional control can modulate
representation of a fearful stimulus in the brain.
Study 2 also examined the neural correlates of mental imagery-based distraction,
identifying modulation in the anterior insula related to the downregulation of conditioned fear.
This is consistent with previous research demonstrating involvement of the aIn in emotional
appraisal and subjective fear (Buhle et al., 2014; Delgado et al., 2008; Fullana et al., 2016).
However, this investigation did not identify amygdala modulation by distraction in Study 2,
despite showing elevated amygdala activity in response to the CS+. This is again consistent with
prior studies noting a lack of amygdala response in some forms of emotion regulation (Fullana et
al., 2016), despite the amygdala’s common inclusion in fear networks. This examination of the
roles played by the aIn and amygdala in subjective and associative fear was continued in Study
3, in which both the aIn and amygdala were identified as components in dissociable networks
relating to expectation and associative strength respectively.

83

Additionally, self-reported difficulty results from Study 1 and Study 2 revealed that
mental-imagery was significantly more difficult than the object-based distraction. Study 2
examined this contrast in the brain and identified regions of the prefrontal cortex in which
activity was elevated during the mental imagery task. This supported the implication from Study
1 that distraction via mental imagery requires greater cognitive resources than object-based
distraction. Greater engagement of cognitive processing does not contradict the assumption of
biased-competition for visual processing, but may raise questions regarding how mental imagery
interacts with other cognitive elements in emotion regulation paradigms.

REGULATION OF CONDITIONED FEAR
Our findings confirmed that differential fear conditioning can be regulated via attentional
effects, however, there were notable differences between the regions of interest described in the
literature and those identified by our results. Namely, response in the amygdala was considerably
less robust than predicted. The absence of significant amygdala modulation in Study 2 and
presence of significant, but less robust modulation of the amygdala than predicted in Study 3
suggests that both object-based and mental imagery-based distraction may have a weaker
influence on differentially conditioned amygdala reactivity than reactivity to inherently fearful
stimuli. Additionally, the aIn downregulation identified in Study 2, paired with the robust aIn
involvement in the expectancy trend in Study 3, suggests that the effects of differential
conditioning in the aIn are more strongly modulated by distraction than in the amygdala. These
findings allow us to infer that associative fear response, while induced by fear conditioning, was
only weakly regulated by mental imagery-based and object-based distraction. Subjective fear
appraisal, however, reacted strongly to both distraction paradigms. That these two components of
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fear processing were dissociable in Study 3 supports the theory that the two can be affected to
different degrees.
While the amygdala was identified as part of the associative strength network, amygdala
activity was most strongly elevated following initial shock trials in a sequence and did not
greatly increase for following sequential trials. This suggests that while associative strength
increases with sequential shock pairings, the strongest influence is induced by the first shock trial
following an absence of shock. The aIn, in contrast, demonstrated a robust positive trend
following subsequent no-shock trials in a sequence. To further explore these trends, we propose
expanding the current paradigm of Study 3 to include longer sequences of shock and no-shock
trials. This would help clarify whether the described trends continue linearly or exhibit nonlinear effects in longer sequences. In the case of the associative strength results, diminishing
returns seem likely with subsequent shock pairings. Study 3 again reinforced that associative fear
and subjective expectancy, while related, can be influenced separately.
A regulatory disconnect between affective strength and subjective appraisal may also
help explain the SCR findings from Studies 1 and 2. While self-report identified a clear
regulatory effect on subjective fear, SCR consistently lacked this robust downregulation.
Elevated SCR in the presence of the CS+ face confirmed the establishment of differential fear
conditioning, but neither the external nor the internal regulation significantly reduced SCR. This
suggests that our distraction paradigm did not regulate autonomic response despite apparent
regulation of subjective fear. Disassociating these components is not a typical goal in fear
regulation research. However, this is consistent with recent research on the specific regulation of
differentially conditioned fear (Wiemer et al., 2021). The distinct expectancy and associative
strength networks identified in Study 3 support the assertion that subjective and associative fear
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are dissociable. Comparing these results to literature using affective images suggests that
differentially conditioned fear responds differently to regulation by distraction than inherently
fearful images. Further research will be necessary to compare fear elicitors under this regulation
paradigm.

CONCLUSIONS
While our primary hypothesis that mental imagery could effectively regulate fear
response was supported, differentiating the effectiveness of mental imagery-based distraction
from object-based distraction was not possible using self-reported fear, SCR, or BOLD intensity.
However, the considerably higher difficulty of mental imagery-based distraction revealed by
self-reported difficulty and BOLD measures in the prefrontal cortex makes it necessary to
qualifying this effectiveness. Both techniques resulted in comparable downregulation of
subjective fear, but the greater difficulty required by the internal task suggests that, given equal
effort, mental imagery-based distraction may be less effective than object-based distraction. In
our paradigm, sufficient cognitive resources were available to perform either task. Were these
tasks to be performed in tandem with a task that requires considerable cognitive effort, it is
possible that the internal task would underperform due to this occupation of necessary resources.
Emotion regulation research notes that some regulation tactics perform better in high or
low affective intensities, rather than being equally effective across stimuli. In particular,
reappraisal-based regulation is less effective under high intensity negative stimuli, while
distraction is more effective at high intensity. Notably, the prefrontal activity in the mental
imagery-based distraction task identified in Study 2 is similar to that found in fMRI studies of
reappraisal (Buhle et al., 2014; Ochsner, Silvers, & Buhle, 2012), particularly the involvement of
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the dlPFC and mPFC. If the difference in effectiveness between reappraisal and general
distraction is due to higher cognitive demand, than this difference should apply to between
mental imagery-based and object-based distraction as well. To address this possibility, future
paradigms could consider comparing high and low intensity stimuli using differential fear
conditioning. Including a low and a high intensity shock stimulus, paired to separate conditioned
stimuli, could be explored to produce stimuli with higher and lower fear response respectively.
Replicating the paradigms used in Study 1 and 2 using multiple fear stimulus intensities could
reveal whether object-based and mental imagery-based distraction regulate their effects with
different degrees of success.
In both distraction and other regulation tactics, elements of mental imagery may be
contributing more significantly to task efficacy than previously predicted. As noted, the dlPFC
regions revealed in the internal task by Study 2 and mPFC activity identified by both Study 2 and
Study 3 have similarities to prefrontal regions identified in reappraisal literature (Buhle et al.,
2014; Ochsner et al., 2012). Reappraisal is assumed to downregulate fear via different
mechanisms than distraction (i.e. by changing meaning while maintaining attention, rather than
redirecting attention). However, many reappraisal paradigms include components of mental
imagery. Consequently, reappraisal techniques may themselves rely on mental imagery
components to a greater degree than assumed. Examining both this relationship and differences
in mental imagery effectiveness by condition will help determine which tactics are more
effective in a given situation. Understanding effectiveness by situation is necessary for targeting
regulation in therapy and clinical settings, as well as for day-to-day management of emotion.
To our knowledge, this investigation is the first direct demonstration of mental imagery
as an attentional target for regulating differentially conditioned fear. Prior research has shown the
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effectiveness of visual distraction in regulating inherently fearful stimuli (Kanske et al., 2011;
McRae et al., 2010; Scheibe et al., 2015; Strauss et al., 2016), and many cognitive emotion
regulation tasks include mental imagery components. However, this investigation appears to be
the first to explicitly target mental imagery and conditioned fear response. Additionally, the
distraction regulation applied in Study 1 and Study 2 uses a novel visual distraction design
targeting object-based and mental imagery-based distraction separately, unlike many existing
paradigms that mix elements of visual and mental distraction (Kanske et al., 2011; McRae et al.,
2012). Finally, while the paradigm used in Study 3 was created by Perruchet et al. (2016), this
investigation was the first to examine the neural correlates resulting from this design.
Cumulatively, these results introduce several novel contributions to the field. Our findings
should encourage existing studies to consider how mental imagery plays a part in their existing
paradigms, and how evidence of dissociable subjective and associative components of fear can
influence future designs.
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